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In 2008, the first international binding document specifically intended for the 
protection and promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities entered into force: the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [CRPD]. It is not a treaty that creates 
new rights, but rather recognizes disability as a human rights issue and the importance of 
the role of governments and society in eliminating the long practice of social oppression, 
and the removal of physical and attitudinal barriers faced by people with impairments. The 
adoption of the CRPD in 20061, was the culmination of a long world wide self-advocacy 
movement that pushed “from below” (Sabetello, 2014: 14) towards the recognition of 
persons with disabilities as subjects of the law and right-holders, as the means to achieve 
equality and full participation in society. 
The CRPD obliges party States to “recognize the right of persons with disabilities 
to education. With a view to realizing this right without discrimination and on the basis of 
equal opportunity, party States shall ensure an inclusive education system at all levels and 
life long learning” (Art. 24.1)2 . Therefore, the international human rights community 
recognizes inclusive education as the most appropriate system under which universal and 
nondiscriminatory education can be achieved.  
                                                        
1 The CRPD was adopted in 2006, during the sixty-first session of the General Assembly by resolution 
A/RES/61/106.  In accordance with its article 42, the Convention was opened for signature as of 30 March 
2007, entering into force “after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession” (CRPD, 
article 45), which was on May 3rd, 2008. For more information on the status of signatories: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=iv-15&chapter=4&lang=en  
2 This applies for elderly persons as well as children. 
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In an attempt to answer the research question: to what extent has the adoption of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [CRPD] has impacted judicial 
decisions on inclusive education in Mexico, Colombia and the European Union?, this study 
adopts a comparative perspective of judiciary decisions in order to explore the impact of 
the ratification of the CRPD in the advancement of the right to inclusive education in the 
selected party States Mexico and Colombia, and region, the European Union.  
For that purpose, the thesis is divided in six sections –the Introduction and five 
Chapters-. On this section, the following paragraphs will cover first the scope of the 
problem, which explores the status of persons with disabilities in relation to their right to 
education, and the role of the judges as political actors that actively participate in decision 
making and standard setting that affect the every-day life of millions of persons; second, 
the justification and methodology followed by the study are presented. The first chapter 
introduces the conceptual framework of the indicators used as the analysis tool. Chapter II 
refers to the analysis of the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights; 
Chapter III does it for the rulings of the Constitutional Court of Colombia; while the fourth 
Chapter presents the results found within the sentences of the Supreme Court of Mexico. 
Concluding, Chapter V discusses the comparisons of the contributions of three judicial 
systems in the protection of the right to education for persons with disabilities. 
 
Scope of the Problem 
 
It is estimated that around one billion people, or 15% of the world’s population, are 
living with disabilities (World Bank, 2016). By far and large, persons with disabilities are 
“invisible” in most societies; they are in little or no ways integrated into community life, 
often discriminated and stigmatized, seen as a mere object of charity and benevolence. 
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According to UNICEF persons with disabilities are among the world’s most marginalized 
groups, “often caught in a cycle of poverty and exclusion” (UNICEF, 2013: 29; World 
Bank, 2016). The consequences of being segregated from society are broad. Persons with 
disabilities are largely denied access to the general school system, which means they will 
likely be denied other rights as they grow older such as the right to employment, live 
independently in community, access to justice, to choose medical treatments, and to fully 
participate in society (OHCHR, "Human Rights of persons with disabilities"; WHO, 2011: 
205).  
The human right to education is pivotal in advancing all disability rights. As 
recognized by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
“education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other 
human rights” (CESCR, 1999: 1). It is considered an empowerment right by which adults 
and children can overcome poverty and participate in every aspect of society; indeed, there 
is a close relationship between a person’s level of education and his or her integration into 
society. According to the United Nations, “[t]he right to education is a universal right 
recognized by international human rights law and, as such, applies to all persons, including 
persons with disabilities” (UN, 2013).  
It is estimated that one third of the 58 million out-of-school children are children 
with disabilities (Saebone, 2015), and that the mean years of education of and adult person 
with disabilities is 3.89 years (WHO 2011: 231). These statistics are a confirmation that 
people with disabilities have historically been excluded from educational opportunities, 
which, as stated before, has hindered their participation in many aspects of life. Therefore, 
guaranteeing access to education for persons with disabilities is their “gateway to full 
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participation in society” (UNICEF 2013: 27). It will secure them a livelihood and apart 
them from risks like exploitation and abuse. Yet, as of today, children with disabilities are 
less likely to start, continue and finish school, compared to children without disabilities; 
although the gap is more pronounced in poorer countries, developed countries and those 
where the general enrollment rate is high, show the same pattern (WHO 2011: 205-9).3 
Monitoring the implementation of Article 24 of the CRPD is not something done 
only in response of the obligation established in Article 35 of the Convention4, but it needs 
to be done in order to support States “to effectively implement the [CRPD] at national level 
and in empowering persons with disabilities to become increasingly aware of their rights” 
(UNOHCHR, 2010: 5). According to the UN, monitors should consider a variety of sources 
while collecting information, such as laws, State policies and programs related to the 
implementation of legislation, as well as decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies 
(Ibid, 40). 
Studying legal cases not only provides evidence of how the judiciaries are applying 
and interpreting rights, but can also give information as to whether or not they are actively 
participating in advancing those rights. Specially, because when a State’s legislator or 
executive fails to take the required measures by, in this case, the CRPD, or falls short in 
guaranteeing any right, the courts my not only directly apply the international legal 
                                                        
3 The data is based on the World Health Survey, which had a participation of 51 countries of the world. 
4 In accordance with article 35, paragraph 1, of the CRPD, each State Party undertakes to submit to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, for consideration by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, a report on measures taken to give effect to its obligations under the CRPD, specifically to 
Monitor progress made in promoting the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the treaties in the context of the 




provision but actually set standards and criterion that must be abided by. By doing so, 
courts are reinforcing their role as protectors of human rights (COE, 2014: 34) and 
consolidating themselves as the means to affirm, consolidate and expand fundamental 
rights (Sieder, et.al. 2011). 
Moreover, due to the ‘legal globalization’5  and ‘judicialization of politics’ the 
judges have now, more than ever, a very active role in decision making for the protection 
of human rights. Best said, judges and courts are now molding –and even sometimes 
elaborating- public policies by creating, interpreting and expanding the rights conferred in 
certain laws (Cepeda, 2011; Couso 2011; Epp, 1998). Therefore, monitoring the judicial 
decisions of the European Union, Colombia and Mexico and comparing them would 
contribute to assess, in a way in which no other monitoring process does, the impact of a 
specific international human rights norm in different regions of the world. That is to say, 
examining the decisions of three different judiciary systems would provide us with much 
more information of the extent of compliance than just an analysis of the incorporation of 




The research uses a qualitative approach. Within this methodology, this research 
includes the analysis of the local and international human rights framework, including 
reports, documents and general comments of UN Organs. These human rights documents 
were closely read and analyzed with respect to the right to education and disability rights, 
                                                        
5 Term used to refer to the transnational dissemination of rules, institutions and legal practices. On the matter, 
See Santos, B. La globalización del derecho: Los nuevos caminos de la regulación y la emancipación, 
Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativos, Bogotá (1998)  
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in order to identify the most important indicators related to the right to education for people 
with disabilities and create a ‘measurement tool’ that was used to analyze the judicial 
decisions and compare the outcomes. The indicators identified were: non-discrimination 
principle, reasonable accommodations, equality and equity, accessibility, other inclusive 
education principles –such as ‘no one-size fits all’ doctrine, participation in society, and 
inclusive education as a right of everyone-, and other barriers –such as the use of 
discriminatory language in decisions-. 
The study takes two countries –Colombia and Mexico- and a region –the European 
Union- as analysis units. Choosing those units responded first, to the need of having two 
countries with enough social, cultural and economic similarities to draw a comparison from 
(Mexico and Colombia); and second, having an internationally recognized judicial leader 
in the advancement of human rights (European Union) to compare with. As to the 
similarities between Mexico and Colombia, first both countries are considered to be 
“developing countries”; second, they have a monist legal tradition; and third, despite the 
significant difference on their population, both countries allocate a very similar percentage 
of their budget to educational purposes. 
Specifically, the investigation focuses on how judicial decisions of the highest court 
of each country/region6 have changed before and after the ratification of the CRPD. For 
this purpose, the time frame established for the review of the judicial decisions is five years 
before and five years after each country/region ratified the Convention. Being for Mexico 
2003-2007 and 2008-2012; Colombia 2006-2010 and 2011-2015; and the European Union 
2006-2010 and 2011-2015. Nonetheless, the time frame for the Mexican case had to be 
                                                        
6 Mexico: National Supreme Court of Justice; Colombia: Constitutional Court; EU: European Court of 
Human Rights.  
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amplified as it ratified the CRPD very early on, which did not coincide with the exact time 
of adopting a national law; also, because the 2008-2012 period was pretty new for everyone 
working on disability rights, which would make it impossible to compare it with Colombia 








  As part of the methodology, it was necessary to establish a conceptual framework 
that allowed the identification of the international standards on the matter of study, which 
was used to orientate the qualitative analysis of the available judicial decisions. Best said, 
the conceptual framework is the guide that was used to set the standards of each indicator 
to be found on the decisions that will allow the final analysis to study the extent to which 
the national and regional courts are incorporating these identified standards into their 
rulings and conclude whether or not the ratification of the CRPD has had any impact at all.  
  According to the United Nations, “[t]he right to education is a universal right 
recognized by international human rights law and, as such, applies to all persons, including 
persons with disabilities” (UN, 2013). These core principles of universalism and non 
discrimination of the right of persons with disabilities to education are present across 
several international documents, starting with Article 26.1 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), which states, “everyone has the right to education”, and later 
strengthened by the legally binding International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1976) and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
mandates States to achieve this right “on the basis of equal opportunity” (1990: Article 
28.1) and without “discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s…disability” 
(Article 2.1). In the regional scope, obligations are stipulated in the Protocol of San 
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Salvador (1999: Article 13)7 and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities (2001: Article III)8.  
  These international documents along with others such as the Standard Rules on the 
equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (1994)9 set the ground for the 
development of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD), which 
obliges party States “to ensure the full enjoyment by children with disabilities of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children” (Art. 7.1) and to 
“recognize the right of persons with disabilities to education. With a view to realizing this 
right without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity, party States shall ensure 
an inclusive education system at all levels and life long learning” (Art. 24.1). Therefore, 
the international human rights community recognizes inclusive education, with special 
support in mainstream settings (Shaw, 2014: 58), as the most appropriate system under 
which universal and nondiscriminatory education can be achieved, and most importantly, 
as the means to achieve full development of human potential and sense of dignity and self-
worth, and to enable persons with disabilities to participate effectively in a free society 
(CRPD: article 24.1.b).  
  Once set the generalities of what Article 24 of the CRPD guarantees, the following 
indicators where chosen for the analysis:  i) Non-discrimination clause; ii) Equity; iii) 
                                                        
7 Article 13.3(e) “Programs of special education should be established for the handicapped, so as to provide 
special instruction and training to persons with physical disabilities or mental deficiencies”.  
8 Article III.1(a) The states parties should undertake “Measures to eliminate discrimination gradually and to 
promote integration…in making available goods, services, facilities, programs, and activities such 
as…education”  
9Specifically, Rule 6 is about education and mandates: “States should recognized the principle of equal 
primary, secondary and tertiary educational opportunities for children, youth and adults with disabilities, in 
integrated settings. They should ensure the education of persons with disabilities is an integral part of the 
educational system”. 
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Reasonable accommodation; iv) Accessibility, Availability, Adaptability and 
Acceptability; v) General principles of inclusive education; and, vi) Other barriers. 
1. Non-discrimination clause 
  The non-discrimination principle is the cornerstone of human rights law and it is 
considered jus cogens. In educational matters, the prohibition of discrimination is not 
subject to either progressive realization or availability of resources, but States have the 
immediate obligation to guarantee the access and exercise of the right to education without 
discrimination (CmESCR 1999: para. 31 & 43; CmRPD 2016: para. 40). Additionally, the 
principle of non-discrimination entails the immediate obligation to ensure non-exclusion 
of anyone from the educational system (CmRPD 2016, para. 13). 
  The non-exclusion or non-rejection clause urges States to take steps to remove all 
barriers and any form of discrimination that impede people with disabilities the right of 
access to education (Ibid, para. 40). On this matter, it is advised that education laws should 
explicitly forbid the denial of admission into mainstream schools- which includes 
discontinuing impairment-based assignment policies- and guarantee continuity in 
education, all reinforced by reasonable accommodation (HRC 2013: para. 26). 
  Article 24 of the CRPD recognizes the right of persons with disabilities to 
education, “[w]ith a view to realizing this right without discrimination” (CRPD: Article 
24.1), which means that the States must ensure that they “are not excluded from the general 
education system on the basis of disability” (CRPD: Article 24. 2.a). For discrimination on 
the basis of disability, the CRPD understands:  
“any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the 
purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It 
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includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable 
accommodation” 
 
  Moreover, Article 5 of the CRPD prohibits discrimination and states that specific 
measures aimed to achieve real equality should not be considered discrimination under the 
Convention’s purposes. That is, States may discriminate in favor of persons with 
disabilities when it is necessary and justifiable to achieve equality. These types of measures 
are known as ‘positive discrimination’ or ‘affirmative actions’. On the matter, the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CmRPD) has stated that the CRPD 
can be breached when the State has failed, without objective and reasonable justification, 
to give differentiated treatment to persons whose situations differ significantly from others 
(2011, para. 8.3).  
  As to whether there has been an objective and reasonable discrimination or not, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CmESCR) in its General Comment 
No. 20 states that the aim and effect of the measure or omission must be legitimate, 
compatible with the Covenant- in this case, the CRPD- and with the purpose of promoting 
welfare in a democratic society; additionally, the effects of the measure or omission must 
be proportionate to the aim sought (2009, para. 13).  
  The CmRPD also claims that, in order to ensure the right to education of people 
with disabilities, all forms of discrimination, direct and indirect, should be recognized and 
addressed by the Member States to identify and remove all “legal, physical, 
communication, social, financial and attitudinal barriers” (2006, para. 13) within the 
community and educational institutions. On indirect discrimination, the CmRPD observes 
that any measure that is applied in a natural manner “may have a discriminatory effect 
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when the particular circumstances of the individual to whom it is applied are not taken” 
(2011, para. 8.3).  
  Consequently, the indicators of non-discrimination I will be looking for in the 
judicial decisions are:  
- Definition: whether the Court gives a definition at all or not, and if it gives its own 
or follows the CRPD’s.  
- Prohibition of exclusion: whether the Court specifically states or not that exclusion 
is prohibited, as it is a form of discrimination. 
- Immediate obligation of the State: whether the Court recognizes or not the 
immediate effect of the non-discrimination clause. 
- Indirect discrimination: whether the Court recognizes or not different forms of 
discrimination, specifically measures that might constitute indirect discrimination. 
- Justified discrimination: whether the Court considers or not that there has been an 
objective and reasonable differentiation between persons with disabilities and 
others that is proportional and pursues a legitimate aim. The measure can be either 
in favor or against persons with disabilities. 
2. Equity and equality 
  The definition of equitable education has shifted over the years and is often 
confused with educational equality. Equality is a principle that goes hand in hand with the 
non-discrimination clause and seeks to achieve an equal state of status and rights; it 
connotes sameness. On the other hand, to achieve equity a person’s context and 
background, opportunities and needs, should be considered. According to Green, a person 
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can be treated unequally, but justly, while “inequity always implies injustice” (1983: 324). 
In the context of education,  
“equity means that each student can benefit from the opportunities 
offered by the system. Education systems must therefore provide for 
substantive equality linked to outcomes. Equity needs to be ensured 
in access, process and results” (HRC 2013: para. 30). 
  While States should always aim for educational equality, when talking about 
traditionally discriminated groups, such as persons with disabilities, equality measures are 
not enough; hence, governments should take actions to guarantee an equitable education. 
Equity requires implementing and institutionalizing measures that help secure all 
children’s right to education to realize their potential and aspirations (UNICEF, 2010). 
  Ensuring equal opportunities is essential to increase access to education, improve 
its quality, and guarantee equity. To do so, States should promote actions that compensate 
for inequalities (HRC, 2011). Article 24 of the CRPD enshrines the right to education for 
people with disabilities on the basis of equal opportunities with others in the community. 
According to Kishore Signh, Special Rapporteur on the right to education, persons with 
disabilities are a group vulnerable to limited opportunities in education due to different 
types of barriers that need to be understood and challenged in order to develop effective 
education policies to guarantee equal opportunities in education (HRC, 2011). Equal 
opportunities should be granted in access, permanence, quality and advancement to higher 
education.  
  Another element to achieve educational equity and guaranteeing equality of 
opportunity is ensuring persons with disabilities the access to a judicial or administrative 
recourse. To do so, States must grant equality before the law to everyone, which means 
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that legal capacity must not be denied only on a personal trait such as disability (CmRPD 
2014: para. 32), but on the contrary, persons with disabilities must be recognized as persons 
before the law with equal standing in courts and tribunals (Ibid, para. 38).  
  Safeguarding equality before the law for persons with disabilities has two effects 
on the right to education. First, in case of a breach to the right, equal recognition before the 
law grants access to justice on an equal basis with others, which is essential for persons 
with disabilities to claim their rights. Second, the CmRPD affirms that inclusive education 
provides persons with disabilities- especially those with psychosocial and intellectual 
impairments- with the opportunity to develop the expression of will (2014, para. 49), which 
is very important to exercise their legal capacity, access to justice and claim their rights. 
  Furthermore, for rights to have real purpose, appropriate reparations must be 
available to redress violations (HRC 2013: para. 24). Appropriate reparations are those 
adequate, effective and prompt measures (GA, 2005) capable of terminating an arbitrary, 
unnecessary, or unjustified action or omission of the State that has resulted in the breach 
of a fundamental right; and those who are capable of preventing any further violation of 
the same nature (Despouy 1998: para. 260).  
  Consequently, the indicators on equity I will be looking for in the judicial decisions 
are: 
- Equality of Opportunity: whether the Court recognizes or not equality of 
opportunity in education for people with disabilities. If that recognition translates 
into the protection of the petitioner’s rights, or the Court just mentions it 
rhetorically failing to protect human rights. 
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- Equality before the law: whether the Court recognizes or not that people with 
disabilities are equal before the law, have legal capacity and access to justice. 
- Reparations: whether the Court mandates or not appropriate reparations to redress 
violations. 
3. Reasonable Accommodation 
  Reasonable Accommodation is defined by the CRPD as: 
“necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a 
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure 
to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with 
others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 2, para. 4). 
 
  Any legislative definition of ‘reasonable accommodation’ should refer to the one 
that appears in the CRPD, and include its denial as an act of discrimination (UN 2007: 60). 
The modifications and adjustments, as enshrined in the CRPD and in terms of ensuring 
education for persons with disabilities, must be provided in order to promote equality and 
eliminate discrimination (Article 5.3), and in accordance with every individual’s 
requirements (Article 24.2.c). Any failure to provide them or the denial of this provision 
constitutes discrimination (Article 2, para. 3).  
  States are required to deliver these accommodations free of cost for people with 
disabilities and their families, as it has been recognized by the Committee that no parents 
should be obligated to pay for their children’s education nor for any reasonable 
accommodations that might be needed (CmRPD, 2011: para. 444). Moreover, the CmRPD 
has pointed out in some concluding observations to different countries that the “duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation is of immediate character and is not subject to 
progressive realization” (2011: para. 44; 2012: para. 41). 
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  On reasonableness, the General Assembly established that is the “result of an 
objective test that involves an analysis of the availability of resources, as well as the 
relevance of the accommodation, and the expected goal of countering discrimination” 
(HRC 2013: para. 43). Nonetheless the Committee still needs to develop jurisprudence on 
the testing standards; it is inclining towards recognizing the necessity of making a 
balancing test that assesses the specific context of the child, the characteristics of the 
school, and whether or not the measure would represent an undue burden (CmRPD 2016) 
for the education provider.  
  Although reasonable accommodation is a duty of immediate character, it has been 
stressed that undue burden implies some degree of progressive realization (Arnardóttir, and 
Quinn 2009: 104). The standard of progressive realization indicates that obligations should 
be subject to the “maximum availability of resources” which according to the CmDESC, 
should be assessed by taking into consideration a number of elements, such as the intention 
to fulfill rights by the measures taken, the particular context, the non-discrimination clause 
and the overall obligation to develop an inclusive education system (HRC 2013, para. 44). 
However, lack of resources and high cost cannot be used as justification by the State to 
evade its obligations (CmRPD 2016, para. 28), which intensifies the need of a balancing 
test. 
  Additionally, according to the CmRPD any specific accommodation should be 
taken alongside, and not instead, of general accessibility and adaptability measures to 
guarantee inclusion in the schools, and through discussions between the school, the student 
with a disability, and, when needed, their family members (2016, para. 29). 
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  Consequently, the indicators on reasonable accommodation I will be looking for in 
the judicial decisions are: 
- Definition: whether the Court gives a definition at all or not, and if it gives its own 
or follows the CRPD’s. 
- Balancing test: whether the Court makes a balancing test to determine a reasonable 
accommodation; or, to assess if the measure provided follows the international 
standards. 
- Specific and general accommodations: whether the Court recognizes and/or 
mandates specific alongside general accommodations. 
- Undue Burden: whether the Court makes an analysis or not to assess if the measure 
taken represents or not an undue burden. 
4. The Four A’s 
  The “Four A’s” were adopted by the CmDESC as universal categories to establish 
the State’s obligations regarding the right to education10. They were introduced by Katarina 
Tomasevski, former Special Rapporteur on the right to education from 1998 to 200411, and 
have been recognized by the CmRPD as four interrelated features that are essential to fulfill 
the right to an inclusive education. The “Four A’s” are: accessibility, availability, 
adaptability and acceptability.  
a. Availability: demands that the States provide enough educational institutions for 
everyone. In other words, education must be generally available, and must be free 
and compulsory (Tomasevski 2004). Institutions should have all elements to 
                                                        
10 See generally, CmESCR OG 13 
11  See, Human Rights Commission Reports, Katarina Tomasevski: E/CN.4/1999/49, párrafos 51-74; 
E/CN.4/2000/6 y E/CN.4/2001/52, párrafos 64-65. 
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function, such as: a building, sanitation facilities, trained teachers with competitive 
salaries, teaching materials, libraries, and technology, among others (CmDESC 
1999: para. 6). The CmRPD adds to these requirements to have “accurate data on 
persons with disabilities, in order to guarantee the necessary number of available 
educational places, and teaching staff at all levels” (CmRPD 2016: para. 20). 
b. Accessibility: at its core, this feature requires that educational institutions are 
accessible- physically and economically- to everyone without discrimination. 
According to Tomasevski (2004), the minimal international standard is access to 
free compulsory primary and secondary inclusive education. Additionally, States 
have to facilitate access to post-secondary compulsory education and eliminate –at 
all levels- exclusions based on discriminatory traits, including disability. 
Accessibility has three dimensions: 1) non-discrimination, which means that 
education must be accessible to all, specially to vulnerable groups without 
discrimination; 2) physical accessibility, concerning safe and reasonably 
convenient geographic location, or access through technology in “distance 
learning” programs; 3) economic accessibility, meaning it has to be affordable 
(CmESCR 1999, para. 6). Furthermore, former Special Rapporteur Vernon Muñoz 
Villalobos stated that the minimum standards on accessibility should also cover 
communication access- in form of sign language and Braille- and social access to 
peers (HRC 2007: para. 29).  
All of these foster an inclusive environment. The CmRPD has expand on 
accessibility with regards to persons with disability on its General Comment no. 2 
and affirmed: 
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“Without accessible transport to schools, accessible school buildings, and 
accessible information and communication, persons with disabilities would not 
have the opportunity to exercise their right to education (art. 24 of the 
Convention). Thus schools have to be accessible, as is explicitly indicated in 
article 9, paragraph 1 (a), of the Convention. However, it is the entire process of 
inclusive education that must be accessible, not just buildings, but all 
information and communication, including ambient or FM assistive systems, 
support services and reasonable accommodation in schools. In order to foster 
accessibility, education as well as the content of school curricula should 
promote and be conducted in sign language, Braille, alternative script, and 
augmentative and alternative modes, means and formats of communication and 
orientation (art. 24, para. 3 (a)), with special attention to the appropriate 
languages and modes and means of communication used by blind, deaf and 
deaf-blind students. Modes and means of teaching should be accessible and 
should be conducted in accessible environments. The whole environment of 
students with disabilities must be designed in a way that fosters inclusion and 
guarantees their equality in the entire process of their education.” (CmRPD 
2014: para. 39)  
c. Acceptability: This concept entails a set of criteria about educational quality 
(Tomasevski 2004). The CmRPD defines acceptability as the obligation to design 
and implement all education-related elements –buildings, programs, goods, 
services, curricula and teaching methods- in a way that respects and protects 
different needs, cultures, languages and views, including those of persons with 
disabilities (2016: para. 24; CmESCR 1999, para. 6).  
d. Adaptability: this feature requires that schools adapt to children in accordance with 
the principle of best interest of the child and in recognition of the importance of the 
right to education in the fulfillment of other rights (Tomasevski 2004).  It has to be 
flexible and adapt to the needs of students with different social and cultural settings 
(CmESCR 1999, para. 6). The CmRPD proposes States to adopt the Universal 
Design for Learning (UDL) approach, which recognizes that every student has a 
unique way of learning for which institutions must provide teachers with the 
structure to create adaptable learning environments. Also, curricula must be 
designed to meet the needs of every student (CmRPD 2016, para. 25). Additionally, 
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there is a international tendency to move away from standardized testing as a way 
to assess or measure intelligence and/or academic performance, hence the CmRPD 
encourages States recognize individual progress with broader goals that “provide 
alternative routes for learning, flexible instruction, and multiple forms of student 
assessment” (ibid).   
  Consequently, the indicators on the four A’s I will be looking for in the judicial 
decisions are: 
- Access to education for all: whether the Court establishes or not, explicitly, the 
right of every person to access education and the obligation of the State to provide 
access for all, meeting the standards of the accessibility principle. 
- Universal Design: if the Court mentions, at all, universal design as a way to 
achieve inclusive education. 
- Availability of materials: if the Court recognizes the importance of the availability 
of materials for students with different needs, i.e. books in Braille, multiple media 
options to present content, speech-to-text options, and others. 
- Adaptability of curricula: whether the Court recognizes the importance of adapting 
programs to the needs of every child. 
- Elimination of standardized testing: whether the Court inclines towards the 
elimination of standardized testing, or gives any criteria on this regard.   
5. Inclusive Education 
  It is important to note that inclusive education is the alternative found to previous 
educational models that are considered to be discriminatory: special education and 
integrated schools (HRC 2007). On the one hand, special education perpetuates segregation 
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by placing students in separate environments design to respond or ‘deal’ with different 
impairments, which enhances a deficit approach and limits the students’ opportunities to 
predefined and negative assumptions of potential (CmRPD 2016, para. 11 and 16). On the 
other hand, integration, often confused with inclusion, is the process by which students 
with disabilities “are merely placed in mainstream schools without the additional support 
required to accommodate their individual needs” (HRC 2007, para. 40), compelling them 
to adapt to the existing program and system (CmRPD 2016: para. 11).  
  Inclusive education advocates for persons with disabilities to have access to equal 
developmental opportunities as everyone else. This includes access to education. Hence, 
inclusion is not placing students without adequate support in an unchanged and static 
mainstream setting- that would be integration-, but rather involves transforming the general 
system to accommodate the needs of all learners (Shaw, 2014: 64).  
  The aim of this model is to enroll people with disabilities in regular classrooms, 
where the general –but already adapted- curricula must be specifically accommodated by 
teachers to meet every child’s needs in order to facilitate achievement of fullest potential 
and development, and promote their participation in society (Huerta 1991: 13). Therefore, 
an inclusive model must enable students with disabilities to exercise their right to 
participation through any form of communication12 they need, without any restrictions to 
their language13, and encouraging them to express themselves in the most autonomous way.  
                                                        
12 Article 2 of the CRPD states that “‘Communication’ includes languages, display of text, Braille, tactile 
communication, large print, accessible multimedia as well as written, audio, plain-language, human-reader 
and augmentative and alternative modes, means and formats of communication, including accessible 
information and communication technology” 




  The Salamanca Statement defines inclusive education as the “recognition of the 
need to work towards 'schools for all' - institutions that include everybody, celebrate 
differences, support learning, and respond to individual needs” (UNICEF, “Inclusive 
Education”). Moreover, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNGA, 
2013: para. 7-8) states: 
“Inclusion is a process that recognizes: (a) the obligation to eliminate barriers 
that restrict or ban participation, and (b) the need to change culture, policy and 
practice of the mainstream schools to accommodate the needs of all students, 
including those with impairments. An inclusive education implies transforming 
the school system and ensuring interpersonal interactions based upon core values 
which allow for the full learning potential of every person to emerge…The 
inclusive approach values students as persons, respects their inherent dignity and 
acknowledges their needs and their ability to make a contribution to 
society…Inclusive education is socially important because it provides a sound 
platform for countering stigmatization and discrimination… [and] introduces 
new perspectives for achieving objectives and self-esteem, and empowering 
individuals to build a society based on mutual respect and rights. 
 It is important to emphasize that inclusive education is a right of everyone, with 
special attention to those who are in a vulnerable situation – including racial or ethnic 
diversity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other status- for which is 
essential to guarantee equality of opportunity, non-exclusion and educational quality 
(Echeita and Ainscow 2010). Schools, then, should overcome the idea of ‘standard student’ 
and address specifically every child’s needs. In this sense, the concepts studied above such 
as “reasonable accommodation”, “accessibility”, and “universal design” are fundamental 
in the advancement of an inclusive educational system that promote mutual respect and 
value for all people.    
  According to Article 24 of the CRPD, inclusive education is the means to achieve 
the “full development of human potential and sense of dignity”; the “development by 
people with disabilities of their personality, talents…creativity…mental and physical 
abilities, to their fullest potential”; and, enable them to “participate effectively in a free 
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society”. To do so, international consensus suggests that schools, in their efforts to achieve 
these objectives, should adopt a whole person approach. This recognizes that there is no 
“one size fits all” educational system (HRC 2007: para 41), but the obligation is of the 
institution to provide personalized education, rather than expecting the student to fit the 
system (CmRPD 2016: para. 12). 
  Moreover, research shows that children with disabilities that are enrolled in the 
general education system –i.e. regular classrooms-, are more likely to “finish school, go 
onto post-secondary education and training, get jobs, earn good incomes and become active 
members of their communities” (UN 2007: 82). All of which allows them to achieve the 
goals of full inclusion described in the paragraph above. 
  In spite there are many indicators on inclusive education that could be used to in 
the present study, many of which have been categorized under the topics above, the 
concepts I will be looking for in the judicial decisions are: 
- Personalized education: whether the Court recognizes or not that there is no “one-
size-fits-all” formula, which implicates that besides the general –already adapted 
curricula- every child needs a personalized education.  
- Development to fullest potential and participation in society: whether the Court 
recognizes or not that access to education is key for people with disabilities to 
achieve their fullest potential and participation in society. Especially if they note 
that the only way of guaranteeing this is through an inclusive educational system. 
- Access, permanence and progress to high education: whether the Court recognizes 
or not the importance of this principle, especially for vulnerable groups such as 
persons with disabilities. 
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- Inclusive education as a right for every person: whether the Court recognizes or 
not the universality aspect of inclusive education. 
6. Other barriers 
  While the concepts and indicators expressed in this section enshrine the core 
principles of the right to an inclusive education as cherished in Article 24 of the CRPD, 
there are other aspects that are included in this study to evaluate a more ‘general’ scenario 
of inclusion that influence directly access to education. These elements are: 
a) Attitudinal barriers (stigma): as stated before, people with disabilities face many 
barriers, from physical obstacles in buildings to systemic barriers such as indirect 
discrimination. Often, the most difficult barriers to overcome are attitudes others 
carry towards people with disabilities, which keep them from achieving the 
development to their fullest potential and participation. One of these attitudes is 
defining a person by their impairment. Camilla Croso (2010) has argued that the 
most common structural barriers to the full realization of the right to education of 
people with disabilities are the prevalence and perpetuation of stereotypes and 
attitudinal barriers. She claims that the stereotypes surrounding persons with 
disabilities are present in every teacher, student, school authority, and parents, 
which reinforces their exclusion and strengthens the policies that support it. 
Goffman (1963) explored stereotyped beliefs and their consequences establishing 
that stigma is a discrediting attribution that reduces a “whole and usual person to a 
tainted, discounted one” (p. 3). Later, Link and Phelan (2001) took Goffman’s 
observation to conceptualize stigma as the result of interrelated components 
converging, which include labeling; linking labels to negative dominant cultural 
 25 
beliefs (stereotypes); and, separation of “us” from “them” (pg. 367). 
The importance of analyzing how Courts approach this topic relies on the fact that 
the educational model promoted by the CRPD is based on growing evidence that 
shows that inclusive education “not only provides the best educational 
environment…but also helps to break down barriers and challenge stereotypes” 
(UN 2007: 82-83). 
b) Use of human rights paradigm of disability: A rights-based, and specially a human 
rights-based approach have, to some extent, contributed in advancing the inclusion 
of persons with disabilities. For example, the CRPD understands education not as 
skills, accomplishments o qualifications people should acquire, but as the means to 
enable the development of self-worth and dignity of individuals and respect for the 
worth and dignity of others (Shaw, 2014: 59). It has also nurtured legislation aimed 
to end the historical oppression and segregation that people with disabilities have 
been objects of (Young & Quibell, 2000: 748-9); and, among other things, it has 
fortified the shift from the medical to the social model of disability.  
On the one hand, the medical model, predominant during the nineteenth and most 
of the twentieth century, focuses on functionality of the body. It sees disability as 
an intrinsically bad state and a form of biological determinism (Shakespeare, 1996: 
95), in which any deficit- physical or functional- of the individual is seen as a 
deviation of the norm (Davis, 1995). The public policies drafted under this model 
suggest segregation and institutionalization as best practices. On the other, the 
social model differentiates between impairment and disability, and argues that 
disabilities are socially constructed and the barriers socially imposed (Shakespeare, 
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1996). While not loosing attention on the impairment, it focuses on removing 
disabilities’ social barriers, such as discrimination and negative attitudes, and 
promoting inclusion and equality.  
Built upon the social model and its critics, the human rights approach to disability 
is to consider it as an evolving concept that “results from the interaction between 
persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders 
their full and effective participation in society on a equal basis with others”14. This 
approach views persons with disabilities as right-holders. The analysis will look 
into how the Court understands disability and whether or not it is moving towards 
–or adopting- the human rights paradigm of disability. 
c) Use of discriminatory language: despite the change of paradigms and the 
advancement on the understanding of disability there are still some antiquated 
practices that, directly or indirectly, continue to promote discrimination. Such is the 
case of the use of outdated language on the matters of disability. If we consider that 
“[l]anguage is instrumental in demonstrating the attitudes and beliefs of human 
beings” (Myers, 2013: 3), then terms such as “handicapped”, “feebleminded”, 
“retarded”, “abnormal”, among others -that are commonly found throughout 
different documents, from scientific findings to public policy, and in everyday 
conversations- indicates how a culture perceives its members with disabilities 
(Linton, 1998; Tregoning, 2009).  
Such perceptions are then carried out through behaviors; therefore, it is essential 
that those words and labels be eliminated from common vocabulary, but especially 
                                                        
14 This is the concept of disability drawn in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
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from official documents and discourse. Consequently, this study will loon into 
whether or not the Courts separate themselves from the use of discriminatory 





THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
On rare occasions, the European Union signs international human rights treaties as 
the regional integration organization it is. The reasons for not signing as a community but 
rather as each Member State are many, but mostly because most instruments are open for 
ratification only for States15; and, second because the European Union has its own policies, 
treaties, laws, bodies, and institutional framework that recognize a range of human rights 
standards of its own.  
On this regard, critics have risen from scholars who consider that EU’s legal human 
rights framework is not as wide as those guaranteed within the United Nations system. 
Moreover, it’s been said that the EU’s practice and discourse of human rights is a 
paradox.16 To explain the paradox, Philip Alston and J. Weiler (1998, 661) expressed that 
on the one hand, the EU is a strongly committed defender and promoter of human rights –
both to the inside and the outside of its borders-; but on the other, it lacks a coherent, 
balanced and “fully-fledged” human rights policy.  
                                                        
15 For example, provision for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human 
Rights was only granted trough the Lisbon Treaty. 
16For more information on the matter, See generally: Alston, Philip, and J.H.H. Weiler. 1998. "An 'ever closer 
union' in need of a human rights policy." European Journal Of International Law 9, no. 4: 658; Ahmed, 
Tawhida, and Israel de Jesús Butler. 2006. “The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law 
Perspective.” European Journal of International Law 14, no. 4: 771; Butler, Israel de Jesús. 2011. The 
European Union and International Human Rights Law. OHCHR Regional Office for Europe. Available on: 
http://www.europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf; Koutrakou, V. 
2004. Contemporary issues and debates in EU policy: the European Union and International Relations. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press; Williams, A. 2004. EU Human Rights Policies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Williams, J. 2013. “The Failure of the EU’s Human Rights Policies”. E-International 
Relations Students, April 12. http://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/12/the-failure-of-the-european-unions-external-
human-rights-policy/ 
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Nonetheless, the most important jurisdictional body in human rights in the EU is 
the European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR]17, which enforces the European Convention 
on Human Rights18. Additionally, since December 23rd 2010 the European Union is party 
to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, [CRPD], bounding every 
Member State in the European Union to comply with the instrument and ensuring their 
citizens the rights it guards19, which in many ways enlarges the EU’s policies on disability 
(Waddington, 2009).  
Although the European Convention sets the minimum standard for its 
interpretation, and the ECtHR has no jurisdiction over the CRPD, it can, and has, used 
other international instruments to which the European Union is party to interpret and apply 
a certain right enshrined in the Convention. The ECtHR has specifically done so with 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (Council of Europe, 1952), which establishes the right to 
education, stating that:  
“[i]n interpreting and applying this provision, account must also be taken of any 
relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the 
Contracting Parties and the Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in 
harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part.” (Catan and 
Others v. The Republic of Moldova and Russia 2012, § 136)20 
                                                        
17 Hereinafter I will use “ECtHR” to refer to the European Court of Human Rights 
18 Formerly known as European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
I will use term “European Convention” to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
19 According to Lisa Waddington, the CRPD was the first international instrument that was negotiated and 
signed by Europe as a Community. For more on the matter and its implications, see Waddington, L. 2009. 
“Breaking New Ground: The Implications of Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities for the European Community”. In Arnardttir, Oddny Mjall, Quinn, G (eds.)The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives. Leiden, 
NL: Martinus Nijhoff, ProQuest ebrary. 
20 This has been stated in vast jurisprudence. See Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 
55, ECTHR 2001-XI; Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 67, ECTHR 2008; Saadi v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 62, ECTHR 2008-...; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, 
§§ 273-274, ECTHR 2010 (extracts); Çam v. Turkey , no. 51500/08, § 53, ECTHR 2016. 
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 That being said, this chapter presents the analysis of the judicial decisions of the 
ECtHR from 2006 to date in which it is ruled on the right to education of persons with 
disability. First, it is determined the framework of the right to education for persons with 
disabilities to which the European Union must abide; second, based on the conceptual 
framework, an analysis of the decisions is presented by topic in order to explain the Court’s 
tendency, regression or advancement on the protection and promotion of the mentioned 
right; third, some general conclusions are drawn from the analysis.  
1. Regional framework 
The European Convention is the main regional framework on human rights. 
Although the provision on right to education is not explicitly included in the body of the 
treaty it is recognized in Article 2 of Protocol No. 121. Additionally, this article is often 
interpreted in light of Article 14 of the European Convention that proclaims the prohibition 
of discrimination22. The reading of both articles guaranties the right of every person to 
access education without discrimination.  
Even when Article 14 does not explicitly state ‘disability’ as a protected ground 
under the European Convention, the expression “other status”, considered among the 
grounds for discrimination on Article 14, has allowed the ECtHR to broaden the categories 
and include disability, among others characteristics to the catalogue of non-discrimination 
                                                        
21 The Convention was drafted in broad terms, and is extended with protocols that have been adopted in the 
following years of its ratification. Article 2, Protocol No. 1.- “Right to Education: No person shall be denied 
the right to education. In the exercise of any functions, which it assumes in relation to education and to 
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions.”  
22 Article 14.- “Prohibition of discrimination: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.”  
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directives (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011, 100-102)23. Apart from 
these documents, there is no specific binding regional document regarding the right to 
education; therefore, its regulation is left to local authorities of each Member State and to 
the interpretation of their national courts. 
Nonetheless, the role of the ECtHR is to analyze whether national laws and 
interpretations comply with the standards set by the European Union, and to determine if 
there has been any breach of States’ obligations. After the accession of the EU to the CRPD, 
the obligations imposed by that treaty have become part of these standards that must be 
complied by the 28 members of the Union. In sum, Article 24 of the CRPD should be a 
reference point or the ECtHR for interpreting regional law relating the right to education 
of people with disabilities, and the actions and omissions of its members in this regard. 
2. Analysis of the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights  
For the period established between 2006 and 2016 only four decisions were found 
that serve the purpose of this investigation24. Before the ratification of the CRPD, the 
ECtHR ruled on one case, twice25, which gives us a total of two decisions that were 
analyzed: Case of D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (2006)26, and Case of D.H. and 
                                                        
23 See also Glor v. Switzerland, no. 13444/04, § 80, ECTHR 2009; Çam v. Turkey, Op. Cit. 10. 
24To narrow down the decisions of the ECtHR to the topic of interest, different combination of search terms 
were used to make sure no case was left out. ‘Inclusive education’ and ‘disability’ was the first try with only 
one result obtained; ‘inclusive’, ‘education’ AND ‘disability’ threw out 8 matches; ‘right to education’ AND 
‘disability’ had 9 cases; ‘special education’ AND ‘disability’ cast out five decisions; other combinations 
including the words ‘education’, ‘disability’, ‘article 2, protocol 1’, ‘discrimination on the basis of disability’, 
among other terms, were also used in the research tool. 
25 Due to the rules of procedure, a ruling of a Chamber can be referred, on petition of the parties, to the Great 
Chamber, who analyzes the facts and evidence again to give its own decision whereas to confirm the previous 
one or change it. See Council of Europe, Rules of Court, new edition January 2016. Available on: 
http://www.ECtHR.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (specifically Chapter VII). 
26 From now on D.H. and Others  
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Others v. Czech Republic (2007)27. In addition, after accession the Court delivered two 
more: Case of Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary (2013)28, and Case of Çam v. Turkey (2016)29.  
  For a better understanding, brief descriptions of the facts of each case are presented:  
- D.H. and Others (2006 and 2007): the eighteen Roma applicants were placed in 
special schools intended for children with disabilities; while they alleged 
discrimination in the enjoyment of their right to education on account of their race, 
colour, association with a national minority and ethnic origin, the government 
asserted that each placement was preceded by an assessment of the child’s intellectual 
capacity. The applicants presented evidence of a systematic practice of diagnosing 
Roma children with disabilities to place them in segregated schools. 
- Horváth and Kiss: the Court ruled on the alleged violation of the right to education 
of the two Hungarian applicants, who after being diagnosed as mentally disabled 
were placed in a special school. They claim that this was discriminatory on the basis 
of their Roma origin, that they had been stigmatized in consequence, that their 
schooling assessments had been culturally biased, and that the school’s curriculum 
was limited, which hindered their access to higher education and employment. The 
applicants presented evidence of a systematic practice of diagnosing Roma children 
with disabilities to place them in segregated schools. The Government argued that 
the differentiation had had an objective and reasonable justification based on the 
intelligence and psychometric tests applied to the applicants, and denied a systematic 
practice to discriminate against Roma children. 
                                                        
27 From now on D.H. and Others [GC] 
28 From now on Horváth and Kiss 
29 From now on Çam  
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- Case of Çam: the Court reviewed the refusal by the Turkish National Music Academy 
to enroll a student who was blind, despite having passed the entrance examination. 
The applicant claimed discrimination in her right to education based solely on 
account of her visual disability. The Academy argued that rules of procedure did not 
allowed her enrollment without considering reasonable accommodation, even when 
this was stated on a medical report, which confirmed she could attend lessons in the 
sections of the Conservatory where eyesight was not required. 
The results of the analysis were systematized by topic as further explained. 
A. Conventional control 
  The tendency on this topic is very clear. Before ratification the ECtHR did not even 
mention the CRPD, although by the time the Great Chamber was reviewing D.H. and 
Others (2007) it was already open for signature and the Czech Republic had manifested 
willingness by signing it in March 2007.30 Nonetheless, ECtHR took into consideration 
several UN instruments that were relevant to the case, such as the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, among others31.  
  In contrast, after ratification the ECtHR refers to the CRPD and analyzes the facts 
of at least one case, Çam v. Turkey (2016), considering Article 24. The reasons for the 
ECtHR’s failure to do so in the case if Horváth and Kiss (2013) are unclear, although this 
omission might be due to the facts of the case. Specifically, the plaintiffs were diagnosed 
                                                        
30 Ratification came later, the 28th of September 2009. For complete status of signatures and ratifications, see 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=en  
31 See paragraphs 92-102 of D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, ECTHR 2007. 
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with a disability and therefore placed in ‘special schools’, but the discussion was centered 
on the alleged systemic misdiagnosis of Roma children as mentally disabled as a tool to 
segregate them from non-Roma children in the public school system. That is, the argument 
and discussion was guided by discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin rather than on 
disability.  
B. Non-discrimination 
  Three out of the four decisions of the ECtHR deal with Roma children placed in 
‘special schools’ after being diagnosed with a disability, centering the discussion on racial 
segregation, a battle that has been long fought in national and international courts, rather 
than disability. Nonetheless, some general statements were made by the ECtHR about non-
discrimination and schooling that apply in the context of disability. Moreover, the recent 
decision in Çam (2016) suggests a change in trends. 
  In every case the ECtHR uses the same definition for ‘discrimination’, which is 
drawn from its own case law, and means “treating differently, without an objective and 
reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations.” It also recognizes that 
States have a certain margin of appreciation to assess whether the situation justifies or not 
a different treatment. This margin of appreciation is what the ECtHR observes and rules 
about in every judgment. 
  In D.H. and Others (2006), the ECtHR concluded that the applicants were treated 
differently, namely by placing the students in segregated schools (“special schools”), 
because of the diagnosis of their mental disability, which was considered by the Court to 
be a reasonable measure taken in pursue of a legitimate aim that justified the differentiation 
in treatment, thus it did not constitute a violation of Article 14 taken together with Article 
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2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention. Specifically, the ECtHR established that 
“States cannot be prohibited from setting up different types of school for children with 
difficulties or implementing special educational programs to respond to special needs” (§ 
47), because it pursues “the legitimate aim of adapting the education system to the needs 
and aptitudes or disabilities of the children” (§ 49). These statements are not only contrary 
to the principle of inclusive education as enshrined in Article 24.2(a) of the CRPD, but also 
are an example of the failure to advance a human rights approach to disability.  
  The Great Chamber reversed the ruling and declared a violation of the applicants’ 
rights. This was mainly because the argument of the Government of explaining “the 
difference in treatment between Roma children and non-Roma children by the need to 
adapt the education system to the capacity of children with special needs” (D.H. and Others 
v. Czech Republic [GC] 2007, §197) was not considered satisfactory to justify the measure. 
Nonetheless, the decision revolved, like in the 2006 decision, primarily on the 
discrimination on the basis of the ethnic origin of Roma children rather than on the basis 
of disability; and, just like the in previous ruling, the ECtHR approved the Government’s 
decision to retain a special-school system for children with ‘special educational needs’. 
  This attitude changed drastically after the ratification of the CRPD. On the one 
hand, both decisions rule in favor of the plaintiffs declaring a violation of their right to non-
discrimination in educational settings, although only one of them was based on disability 
grounds. On the other hand, the Court gave more weight, compared to previous cases, to 
the disability topic in Horváth and Kiss (2013) in spite the allegation of the plaintiffs of 
being discriminated on the grounds of ethnical origin like in the cases analyzed before the 
ratification of the CRPD. 
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  In Horváth and Kiss (2013) the ECtHR goes further than in the D.H. and Others 
cases and expresses that while it accepts the position of the State to continue with special 
schools and classes for children with disabilities, it is concerned about the segregation the 
system causes (§ 113), and calls for an elimination of all discriminatory practices disguised 
in neutral situations (§115-117). The latter statement, though, lacks a disability emphasis. 
However, the Court continues to say that: 
“[I]f a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group 
in society, who have suffered considerable discrimination in the past, such as the 
mentally disabled, then the State’s margin of appreciation is substantially narrower 
and it must have very weighty reasons for the restrictions in question....[T]he 
treatment as a single class of those with intellectual or mental disabilities is a 
questionable classification, and the curtailment of their rights must be subject to 
strict scrutiny.” (§128) 
This statement is positive in two ways. One, the Court is recognizing persons with 
disabilities -in particular those with a mental disability- as a group that has been historically 
discriminated against. Second, even when States have a margin of appreciation to decide 
which educational system is better, the Court recognizes that on disability matters a high 
level of scrutiny must be applied in order to determine if the practice is discriminatory, that 
is, that a practice is only justifiable with “very weighty reasons”32. That is, the existence of 
impairment is not a justifiable reason to discriminate on the grounds of disability. 
  The Court had a special opportunity in Çam v. Turkey (2016) to extend its criteria 
on discrimination on the grounds of disability in educational settings and to set standards 
for the obligations of the contracting States, which sets a difference with the cases before 
the ratification of the CRPD. The ECtHR affirmed that States’ obligation to guarantee 
access to education for all exceeds mere prohibition of discrimination and that States have 
                                                        
32 See Mifobova v. Russia, no. 5525/11, § 54, ECTHR 2015; Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, no. 38832/06, § 42, 
ECTHR 2010. 
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the positive obligation to provide effective access to existing educational institutions (Çam 
2016, § 43-47).  
  Moreover, contrary to the previous three cases, the Court concluded that 
discrimination on the basis of disability might not always be on the act itself but on some 
regulations of the school that obstructs or impedes the effective access to education (Çam 
2016, § 56-57). In other words, while denial of registration in an institution due to non-
comply of administrative requirements might be considered a justified non-discriminatory 
measure, a closer review of the facts could indicate that the differentiation in treatment was 
based solely on the disability of the applicant, just like in the Çam case.   
 Unlike any other of the analyzed cases, the ECtHR specifically upheld in Çam (2016) 
the importance of the fundamental principles of universality and non-discrimination in the 
exercise of the right to education (§64). Moreover, the ECtHR recognizes that inclusive 
education is the most appropriate means to guarantee these fundamental principles. 
  Indirect discrimination is a part of the non-discrimination principle that is often 
analyzed by the ECtHR and it refers to the effects of a general policy, measure or provision 
that is expressed in apparent neutral terms, but in practice places a person in a unjustified 
disadvantage compared to others. The ECtHR recognized indirect discriminatory practices 
in three of the four analyzed cases33 allowing less strict evidential rules and shifting the 
burden of proof shifts to the State (Horváth and Kiss 2013, §105-108; D.H. and Others 
2006, §182-189; D.H. and Others 2007, §184-186). Nonetheless, in D.H. and Others (2006) 
the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove indirect discrimination 
(§46). An important shift came after the EU ratification of the CRPD when in Horváth and 
                                                        
33 In Çam v. Turkey there were no allegations of indirect discrimination, therefore the Court did not discussed 
the topic at all.  
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Kiss (2013) the Court specified that in cases in the educational sphere it is not necessary to 
prove any discriminatory intent (§106), thus narrowing down the possibility of justifying 
indirect discrimination.  
  What particularly stands out in these four cases is the lack of discussion, not even 
mention, about the prohibition of exclusion from the general education system. This takes 
on special relevance given that it is a principle enshrined in the CRPD (Article 24, 
paragraph 2.a), and recognized by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability 
(CmRPD 2016) on the “Draft for General Comment No. 4: Article 24, the right to inclusive 
education” as an important clause to be specifically included in national policies. 
Moreover, the Court could have gave some criteria on the matter as different arguments 
were used by member States to justify their discriminatory acts against students, like some 
non-direct exclusion practices such as standardized test requirements to enter school. While 
in Çam (2016) the Court did established that discrimination might not be based on the act 
itself but on some regulations of the school, it failed to recognize that the requirement of 
the medical certificate was an act of non-direct exclusion of students with disabilities. The 
opportunity was clear and the ECtHR did not take it. 
C. Reasonable accommodation 
  On this topic the results were very poor, mainly because three of four cases focused 
their discussion on ethnical origin rather than on disability. The case of Çam (2016) is the 
only one where the ECtHR has had a clear opportunity to set standards on reasonable 
accommodation, but according to this analysis has failed to do so.  
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  The Court cites the definition of ‘reasonable accommodation’ as stated in the 
CRPD, and argues that Article 14 of the European Convention34 should be read in the light 
of this obligation to correct inequalities created by unjustified discrimination (Çam 2016, 
§65). It goes on to recognize that reasonable accommodation, which can take different 
forms, should be granted in the general system as well as for specific needs (§66), and 
considers that any refusal of reasonable accommodation constitute discrimination (§67), 
all of which are settled standards in international law35.  
  However, the Court failed to analyze the accommodation suggested by the medical 
report, which stated that the student was fit to study at the Conservatory in sections where 
eyesight was not required. In response the Conservatory argued that there were no sections 
with such characteristic and that due to failed previous integration attempts in the 1970’s36 
they were no longer accepting students with disabilities. The Court limited to state that it 
had observed that the national authorities did not sought to consider any ‘adjustments’ the 
student might require and had made no attempts since 1976 to adapt to the needs of students 
with disabilities (§68). The ECtHR made no mention at all of the reasonableness of the 
required accommodation, made no balancing test or analyzed if the suggestion of changing 
                                                        
34 Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights establishes the prohibition of discrimination 
35 See generally: Martel, Letícia de Campos Velho. 2011. "Reasonable Accommodation: The New Concept 
From An Inclusive Constitutional Perspective." Sur International Journal on Human Rights 8, no. 14: 85-
111,84; Cera, R. 2015. National Legislations on Inclusive Education and Special Educational Needs of 
People with Autism in the Perspective of Article 24 of the CRPD. In V. Della Fina (Ed.), Protecting the 
Rights of People with Autism in the Fields of Education and Employment [electronic resource]: 
International, European and National Perspective (pp. 79–108). Springer International Publishers; 
UNDESA, et. al. 2007. From exclusion to equality. Realizing the rights of persons with disabilities. 
Handbook for parliamentarians on the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and its optional 
protocol. United Nations, Geneva. http:// www. un. org/ disabilities/ documents/ toolaction/ ipuhb. pdf. 
36The music academy had not made any attempt to adjust its educational approach in order to make it 
accessible to students with disabilities since 1976, when it tried to accommodate a blind student but, in the 
absence of teachers knowing Braille, it waived these attempts. 
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some infrastructure to include blind students represented an undue burden for the State that 
justified the rejection of the student.  
D. Accessibility (and the other 3 A’s: Availability, Adaptability, and Acceptability) 
  Only a few judicial statements on accessibility, availability, adaptability and 
acceptability show a shift in attitude since the ratification of the CRPD. Although the 
ECtHR analyzed the right to education in the D.H. and Others cases (2006 and 2007), it 
did not mention States’ obligation to provide universal access to the education system. 
Rather, the discussion centered only on whether the applicants were discriminated against 
under Article 14 of the European Convention in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1.  
  Similarly, in neither of the post-CRPD ratification cases has the Court addressed 
this issue. In Horváth and Kiss (2013) although the petitioners made complaints under 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 read in conjunction with Article 14 of the European Convention, 
the Court examined the case under non-discrimination and overlooked the right to 
education. Hence, there is no discussion whatsoever about the obligation of the State to 
provide access to school for all and what it entails, for example universal design. Moreover, 
the plaintiff’s allegation in Çam (2016) of violations of both her right to education and non-
discrimination on the basis of her disability, was ultimately resolved only on the latter. The 
Court ruled only under the analysis of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 
1, concluding that it was not necessary to do a separate examination of the case under the 
right to education (§ 70). Nonetheless, the Court provided some guidance on the matter, 
which might be due to the fact that for the first time the Court relied on Article 24 of the 
CRPD as one of the international applicable laws.  
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  Specifically, the ECtHR affirmed the obligation of the State to guarantee access to 
education for all and that the government has the positive obligation to provide effective 
access to the existing educational institutions (Çam 2016, § 43-47). For effective access 
the Court interpreted access to existing educational institutions that are available at the 
time, which would call for reasonable accommodation; and stated that even when the 
school in question provides education under the artistic sphere and is out of the primary, 
secondary and higher education fields, access must still be granted and its conditions can 
be examined under the scope of Article 2 of Protocol 1 (§ 43). 
  Adaptability of curricula was something found across the four cases under study. It 
is addressed as something that falls only in the scope of national authorities and therefore 
there is no room for the Court to rule on the matter or even set any standards (D.H. and 
Others 2006, §47-49; D.H. and Others 2007, §205; Horváth and Kiss 2013, §125-127; Çam 
2016, §66). Nonetheless, the judges expanded their arguments to what appears to be a path 
for setting some standards; though it is unclear whether it responds to the ratification of the 
CRPD or to the facts of the cases. What is clear is a tendency to accept that “special 
school’s” curricula is often less competitive, which hinders the students’ future 
possibilities. Still, the ECtHR fails to set any standard regarding the adaptability of 
curricula, but leaves it completely open for the State’s margin of appreciation (D.H. and 
Others 2006, §47).  
 In D.H. and Others [GC] (2007) the ECtHR maintains the same argument (§205), 
but goes further to recognize that schools for children with disabilities often have a more 
basic curriculum than regular schools which compromise their development and even limit 
their job opportunities (§207). It also “notes with interest” the abolishment of special 
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schools in the Czech Republic (§208). Nonetheless, it again fails to provide concrete 
guidance on the obligation to adapt the curriculum to everyone’s needs.  
 In Horváth and Kiss (2013), the ECtHR retained the same approach. In this case, it 
recognized that the State can use its discretion in adapting the curricula and define the 
manner and means of meeting the educational needs of children with disabilities; but, at 
the possibility of interfering with the enjoyment of a right, then the State must attend 
adequate safeguards to remain within the scope of its margin of appreciation (§126-127) 
and protect human rights. In that sense, the ECtHR resolved that the basic curriculum 
followed in ‘special schools’ resulted in the hindering of the development of the pupil’s 
skills and the isolation from the wider population, which was considered by the Court “did 
not offer the necessary guarantees stemming from the positive obligations of the State (…)” 
(§127). The latest contribution was made in Çam (2016), where the ECtHR recognized that 
the adaptability of curricula is a form of reasonable accommodation that falls under the 
obligations of the State (§66). 
  The ECtHR had only one opportunity to pronounce on availability of materials. In 
Çam (2016) the Court observed that the attempts to register students with disabilities were 
no longer pursued after 1976 due to lack of teacher training and availability of adaptable 
materials, especially on Braille. Even though the situation prevailed and the applicant was 
rejected from registration to school for the same reasons, the Court did not made any 
assertions as to the obligation of the State on the matter as it is established in the CRPD.  
  Last but not least, the Court addressed the issue of standardized testing in three out 
of four cases under study. In the D.H. and Others cases the applicants claimed a 
discriminatory use of standardized test that send them to ‘special schools’, but only the 
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Great Chamber in 2007 acknowledged “that the tests used to assess the children’s learning 
abilities or difficulties have given rise to controversy and continue to be the subject of 
scientific debate and research” (§199). Nonetheless, the Court affirmed that it was not its 
role to judge the validity of such tests. After ratification, the Court remained doubtful to 
encourage moving away from standardized testing. In Horváth and Kiss (2013) stated that 
it could not take a position as to the acceptability of such tests (§118), but could assess if 
any good faith efforts have been made to avoid discriminatory testing (§119). 
E. Equity and Equality 
  The only clear shift on this topic that can be related to the ratification of the CRPD 
is the recognition of the obligation of the States to ensure equality of opportunity in 
education. The first two decisions ruled before the accession of the European Union to the 
CRPD make no mention of the importance of safeguarding the principle of equity with 
respect to the right to education. In Horváth and Kiss (2013) the ECtHR recognizes that to 
guarantee equality of opportunity at schools the authorities should set up appropriate 
support structures to benefit everyone (§104). It went on to determine that the failure to 
specify the applicant’s “special educational needs” violated its rights to equal opportunity 
(§122). 
  In Çam, the Court declared that States have to comply with their positive obligation 
to provide education in equal opportunities to all members of society by creating the 
necessary conditions for people with disabilities to access the educational system (§47). It 
specifically mentioned that the Turkish government had ignored the essence of the right to 
education by not creating opportunities for blind people from 1976 to 2004; the period 
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covered between the times a person with disability was accepted in the Arts Institute and 
the rejection of Mrs. Ceyda Çam (§47). 
  What particularly stands out in this context is the lack of recognition of the Court 
of the principle of equality before the law, enshrined in Article 12 of the CRPD37. Although 
non of the analyzed cases deals specifically with facts that prohibited or hindered the 
applicant’s equal recognition, the Court could have acknowledge that such principle is 
essential for persons with disabilities to claim their right to inclusive education, as 
enshrined in Article 24 of the CRPD.  
  Moreover, the recognition of this right opens the door for people with disabilities 
to access the justice system, claim their rights and, in case of violations, obtain proper 
reparations. On the matter, it is surprising that the ECtHR did not ordered reparations in all 
decisions analyzed. Although the Court mandated a declaratory judgment establishing a 
breach of the European Convention38 and a monetary compensation, it did not go further 
to order specific non-monetary relief for violations of the European Convention. For 
example, the ECtHR could have ordered the immediate enrollment of Ms. Çam in the 
                                                        
37 Article 12 - Equal recognition before the law: “ 1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have 
the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law. 2. States Parties shall recognize that persons 
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 3. States Parties shall 
take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity. 4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of 
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal 
capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue 
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person's circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and 
are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The 
safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person's rights and interests. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all appropriate and effective measures to 
ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial 
affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit, and shall ensure 
that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.” 
38 Only in three out of four cases. In D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (2006), the Court found no violation 
of the claimed rights.  
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school of music accompanied by the proper identification of her needs and tailor its lessons 
to blind students; in D.H. and Others, where it was demonstrated that the Roma children 
were not mentally impaired, the Court could have order their immediate placement in 
regular schools; in Horváth and Kiss, the elimination of the intelligence test used to assess 
the child’s abilities; among other forms of relieves.  
  Although such non-monetary compensations are not a common practice to the 
ECtHR (Nifosi-Sutton, 2010), they could have transferred a strong message about the 
critical role of inclusive education. If we consider, in general terms, that people with 
disabilities have been traditionally segregated from the educational system, a practice that 
prevent them from integrating to society and developing to their fullest potential, the 
ECtHR should be considering to extend its remedies to non-monetary forms of relief and 
contribute to the protection of human rights of persons with disabilities in the region. Not 
only this is a common practice of other Courts, like the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court, but also it would help to end the EU’s paradox explained at the beginning of the 
Chapter. 
F. Other principles of Inclusive Education 
  As stated at the beginning of this section, only one out of four cases refers to Article 
24 of the CRPD, which translates into the fact that the same case, Çam v. Turkey (2016), 
is the only one to recognize inclusive education as the most appropriate means to ensure 
the right to education (§ 64). More specifically, the ECtHR recognizes that inclusive 
education is the only way to achieve universality and non-discrimination in the exercise of 
such right (§ 64). It also is the only case in which the Court makes a clear statement that in 
a democratic society access to education is essential to the realization of other rights and 
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one of the most important public services in the modern State (§ 52). These statements 
show a clear evolution of the Court’s standards after the ratification of the CRPD. The 
following paragraphs strengthen this argument. 
  In D.H. and Others (2006), the oldest case in this study, the ECtHR was presented 
with evidence of ‘early tracking’, inferior curriculum of ‘special schools’, low 
opportunities to gain access to other levels of educations and use of standardized tests, all 
of which reduces chances of developing fullest potential and integration of people with 
disabilities into society, some of the cornerstones on inclusive education. Still, the judges 
found justification for the acts of the authorities and no breach of the European Convention. 
While the Great Chamber in 2007 found the same allegations to be contrary to the European 
Convention, it failed to provide standards on inclusive education. The judges merely 
affirmed that non-direct discriminatory practices against the Roma students were found, 
but no further analysis of those practices and their effect on the educational system were 
made. 
  With regards to the obligation to guarantee access, permanence and progress, in the 
cases of D.H. and Others (2006 and 2007) and Horváth and Kiss (2013), the applicants 
argued that the ‘special education’ system was preventing them to register in secondary 
and higher education, mainly because of the lower curricula that it followed. The ECtHR 
noted “[t]hese children are unlikely to break out of this system of inferior education, 
resulting in their lower educational achievement and poorer prospects of employment” 
(Horváth and Kiss 2013, §115). Despite the above-mentioned allegations, the Court failed 
to comment on the importance on guaranteeing permanence and progress on the general 
education system besides providing effective access.  
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  Regarding the principle no one size fits all’, in Çam (2016) the ECtHR 
acknowledged that each child has educational needs of their own (§ 66), but that States 
cannot be required to create individualized lessons for students with disabilities (§ 43). 
Although it looks like it opened the path to set a standard on the obligation of the States to 
adopt a ‘whole person approach’ (CmRPD 2016) and adapt the educational system to the 
child instead of forcing a child into the system, the Court remained itself from demanding 
members States to comply with such obligation. 
G. Other barriers 
 
With regards to the three indicators used to identify “other barriers”, the ECtHR 
did not mention anything about the role that attitudinal barriers play in access and 
permanence in the educational system for persons with disabilities. The Court missed the 
opportunity to set criteria on this matter, especially considering that doing so would amount 
to the recognition of the historical discrimination against people with disabilities, the status 
of vulnerable group and the ongoing segregational practices. 
Additionally, not enough manifestations of the adoption of a human rights approach 
to disability were found in all cases. While there were no signs of retrogressions to a 
medical model, neither were there any suggestions of moving, at least, towards considering 
‘disability’ as an evolving concept. Though, the ECtHR does recognize persons with 
disabilities as right-holders.   
Lastly, no discriminatory language was found on any of the ECtHR’s decisions that 
were analyzed for the purpose of this study. Therefore, there is no concluding evidence that 
would show any influence of the ratification of the CRPD in the language used in the 
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rulings. Further investigation in older cases would be needed in order to identify whether 
or not –and when- the Court has ever used discriminatory terms.  
3. Conclusions  
It is difficult to conclude that there is enough evidence to state that the ratification 
of the CRPD represented a threshold in the ECtHR jurisprudence for the recognition of the 
right to education of persons with disabilities as it is enshrined in Article 24 of the CRPD 
and other international standards. First, because four cases are not enough to establish such 
conclusion; second, because three of those four rulings dealt, primarily, with discrimination 
on the basis of national origin rather than on disability. 
Nonetheless, some interesting findings can be highlighted. With regards to the 
Roma children, the Court recognizes that special direct or indirect arrangements for a 
certain group of persons can constitute a differentiation in treatment subject to examination 
under Article 14 of the European Convention that prohibits discrimination. This issue was, 
at least in Horváth and Kiss, transferred to the problem of placing children with disabilities 
in segregated schools rather than in the ‘regular’ institutions, which was considered to be 
a violation of their rights.  
In a more general aspect, while without a doubt the European Convention was never 
meant to advance on the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities, the ECtHR 
must rely on the CRPD to interpret and apply the provisions of Article 2, Protocol 1 of the 





This chapter presents the analysis of the judicial decisions of the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia [CCC] from 2006 to 2015 in which it is ruled on the right to education 
of persons with disabilities. First, it is determined the framework of the right to education 
for persons with disabilities to which Colombia must abide; second, based on the 
conceptual framework, an analysis of the decisions is presented by topic in order to explain 
the Constitutional Court’s tendency, regression or advancement on the protection and 
promotion of the mentioned right; third, some general conclusions are drawn from the 
analysis.  
1. National Framework 
As a monist country, international treaties and agreements ratified by Colombia 
have priority domestically. Additionally, every right and duties conferred at a national level 
must be interpreted in accordance with such international treaties and agreements. These 
provisions are enshrined in article 93 of the Political Constitution of Colombia [Const.] 
(Const. 1991), which was interpreted by the CCC in 2010 to affirm the supremacy of 
international human rights law in domestic jurisdiction39  
Unlike other countries, Colombia guarantees a constitutional right to education 
preserved in Article 67 (Const. 1991). While the Colombian Constitution does not provide 
a specific model of education, the CCC through the interpretation of various articles of the 
National Constitution, laws and international instruments has inclined to establish that this 
right has the status of fundamental right and is ought to be inclusive. 
                                                        
39 Constitutional Court, April 21st, 2010, Decision C-293/10 
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Colombia signed the CRPD on September 11, 2008. Subsequently, the Senate 
enacted Law 1346 on July 31st, 2009 through which the CRPD was adopted at a national 
level. Then, in April 2010, the CCC approved both Law 1346 and the CRPD40 in order for 
the Government to ratify the instrument -without putting any reserves- on May 10th, 2011. 
Thus, Colombia has an unquestionable obligation to abide by the CRPD and its national 
laws to protect and guarantee access to education for persons with disability.  
 Besides Law 1346, which reproduces in its entirety the CRPD, the most important 
legislation on education is in Law 115 of 1994 or “General Law of Education” (Congreso 
de Colombia 1994). Law 115 establishes the general principles and conditions under which 
the pubic service of education must be provided: State education is free of charge; equal 
opportunity in access and permanence; and, education as a public service with social 
purpose, for full development of the personality within a comprehensive physical, 
psychological, intellectual, ethical and emotional formation. Moreover, it sets the State’s 
obligation to provide education attending the specific needs of the population with 
disabilities, through the enactment of a public policy that ensures their integration within 
the official educational institutions, in order to eliminate all forms of discrimination and 
exclusion against people with disabilities, equalize opportunities and guarantee their right 
to education (Congreso de Colombia 1994, Article 46). 
 While Law 115 still focuses on an integration approach, a more recent Act –Law 
1618 of 2013 (Congreso de Colombia 2013), establishes the provisions by which the rights 
of persons with disabilities must be guaranteed. Specifically, Law 1618 states that to ensure 
effective exercise of the rights of persons with disabilities all measures adopted by the 
                                                        
40 Through sentence C-293-10 on April 21st, 2010. 
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Colombian State –including public policy, laws, affirmative actions and reasonable 
accommodations- must be under an inclusive approach. Although it does not mandates to 
adopt inclusion as the national policy on education, the Law provides several obligations 
oriented to guarantee the right to education under inclusive principles, including: promote 
diversity; ensure educational quality oriented to reduce inequalities; guarantee access and 
permanence with inclusive approach; primary and secondary education must be free of 
charge and obligatory; access to high education and professional training in equality of 
opportunity; identify barriers that hinder access; prevent exclusionary practices; teacher 
training; among others (Congreso de Colombia 2013, Article 11). 
 In sum, Colombia is compelled to protect and guarantee the right to education for 
persons with disability exactly as it is cherished in Article 24 of the CRPD. 
2. Analysis of the judicial decisions of the Colombian Constitutional Court  
For the period established between 2006 and 2015 seventeen decisions were found 
that serve the purpose of this investigation41. Before the ratification of the CRPD, the CCC 
ruled on nine cases42. In addition, after accession and until December 2015, the Court 
delivered eight more43. The results of the analysis were systematized by topic as further 
explained. 
A. Conventional control 
The CCC has a long tradition of applying international law to interpret national 
provisions. Since 1992 the CCC has used the jurisprudential notion of “constitutionality 
                                                        
41To narrow down the rulings of the CCC to the topic of interest, the search-term used was: ‘Inclusive 
education’ and ‘disability’, as well as “education” and “disability” 
42 T-884/06; T-170/07; T-454/07; T-282/08; T-022/09; T-560/10; T-899/10; T-974/10; and, T-994/10 
43 T-051/11; T-551/11; T-495/12; T-647/12; T-294/13; T-598/13; T-850/14; and, T-465/15 
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block” 44  to incorporate international human rights law as necessary premises of its 
reasoning in interpreting and applying national legislation (Cepeda 2008). Thus, the 
seventeen decisions included in this analysis incorporate many international instruments 
and documents, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Persons with 
Disabilities, American Declaration on Human Rights, San Salvador Protocol, General 
Comments, among others.  
 Nonetheless, what is very clear is that all sentences from 2010 to 2015 cite the 
CRPD and specially article 24. Moreover, the CCC takes the standards set in Article 24 as 
part of the “constitutionality block” and criteria the Court must abide by in its resolution. 
Since the CCC does not declares violation of specific instruments or laws –and their 
articles- but of a fundamental right, such as the right of education, that is part of the 
“constitutionality block”, there is no mention on any of the decisions to whether the CRPD, 
specifically Article 24, was breached or not. Instead, the CCC concludes that the right to 
education of the petitioners was infringed because actions or omissions were did not 
comply with the national and international standards. Although, in one sentence the Court 
found that the right to inclusive education of the petitioner had been violated because the 
                                                        
44 The “constitutionality block” is a concept used to refer to those norms and principles that are not formally 
contained in a Constitution, but are used as parameters of constitutional review. For more information on the 
use of the “constitutionality block” by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, See generally: Arango Olaya, 
M. 2004. “El bloque de constitucionalidad en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana”. Pp. 
79-102. Available: http://www.icesi.edu.co/contenido/pdfs/C1C-marango-bloque.pdf; Uprimy, R. 2005. “El 
Bloque de Constitucionalidad en Colombia: Un análisis jurisprudencial y un ensayo de sistematización 
doctrinal”. Red de Escuelas Sindicales. Universidad Nacional-ENS Colombia. Available: 
http://redescuelascsa.com/sitio/repo/DJS-Bloque_Constitucionalidad(Uprimny).pdf 
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State failed to provide reasonable accommodations with the characteristics set by the 
CRPD45. 
B. Non-discrimination 
  On the principle of non-discrimination, the ratification of the CRPD means no 
threshold in comparison with the rulings of the CCC before Colombia’s accession to the 
treaty. In all seventeen decisions, the Court recognized non-discrimination as a 
fundamental principle of immediate application; specifically because of the historic 
discrimination people with disabilities in Colombia have been target of.  
  The CCC recognized in all seventeen judgments that discrimination on the basis of 
disability is not only prohibited, but the State has the immediate obligation to provide 
“special” constitutional protection to such groups in response to historic discrimination. 
Particularly, the Court makes emphasis on the fact that positive discrimination is allowed 
and that any omission to adopt such provisions constitutes a breach of the non-
discrimination clause. 
  Although as part of the analysis of the “constitutionality block”, the CCC takes the 
definition of discrimination against persons with disabilities form various international 
instruments, the Court gives its own definition in only in one sentence -delivered after 
ratification of the CRPD-, and it as follows:  
 
“any behavior, attitude or treatment, conscious or unconscious, intended to annul or 
restrict their rights, freedoms and opportunities without objective and reasonable 
justification (…). [Also], the discriminatory act consisting of an unjustified 
omission in the special treatment persons with disabilities are entitled to, which 
brings as a direct effect their exclusion from a benefit, advantage or opportunity " 
(CCC 2013b, 17).46 
                                                        
45 T-598/13, p. 40 
46 Translation of my own 
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  The CCC reiterates one ruling after another that positive discrimination, also called 
affirmative actions, not only is encouraged to remove all the obstacles that impede the 
social inclusion of people with disabilities, but it is also justified under international and 
national standards. On this particular matter, the only change that can be attributed to the 
ratification of the CRPD is that before the ratification the CCC made reference to “social 
integration”, notion that after ratification was changed to “social inclusion”. The change in 
the language used is a discussion that will be expanded further in the chapter. Also, the 
CCC echoes in the seventeen decisions the importance of positive discrimination in 
countering the negative effects of the continuing discrimination against people with 
disabilities and closing the inequality gap. 
  The CCC only develops on the possibility of a justified discrimination in one case, 
T-551/11, in which a University offers special admission quotas and financial aid for 
people who belong to vulnerable groups, except for the disabled community. In this case, 
while the Court recognized the competence of the University to implement affirmative 
actions to guarantee the right to education to everyone, it concluded that the incentives 
offered by the University couldn’t be considered as justified discrimination and affirmative 
action because the measure adopted excluded a particular vulnerable group in violation of 
the principle of equality of opportunity. Moreover, the Court stated that in order to verify 
whether the difference in treatment could be justified or not, a proportionality test must be 
applied (CCC 2011b, 34). Also, in other case, T-051/11, the CCC stated that the State has 
burden of proof to show that the measure taken responds to reasonable and proportionate 
reasons, and that it was accompanied by other actions aimed at countering the adverse 
effect that the adopted measure might bring to a specific group (CCC 2011a, 47). 
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  Additionally, the Court amounts to the non-discrimination arguments recognizing 
the existence of actions or omissions that indirectly constitutes discrimination. In the case 
T-022/09 –delivered before ratification- the CCC makes no explicit recognition of the 
existence of indirect discrimination, but concludes that the adoption of a new regulation in 
the school which requires students to change rooms for every course, was indeed 
discriminatory as it presents an obstacle for those students who have impairments that 
difficult their mobility, and due to the new requirement are always arriving late to course 
or even cannot access the room which is a violation of their right to education (CCC 2009, 
20-21). The CCC defines indirect discrimination as “the one that derives from the 
application of apparently neutral norm, but in practice generate an adverse and 
disproportionate effect against a traditionally marginalized or discriminated group” 47 
(CCC 2011a, 46). It is important to note that this recognition was only found in two cases, 
both after the ratification of the CRPD48. On the matter, the CCC stated: 
 
“[T]he omission in providing a more favorable treatment is a form of 
discrimination, even when there is no intention to discriminate, it does not mean 
that the content of the norm is not exclusive (...) The violation of the non-
discrimination clause may originate in a deliberate act or an unplanned output, 
which in any case involves the violation of the right to non-discrimination. Its 
constitutional prohibition is intended to prevent the abridgment, restriction or 
exclusion in the exercise of the rights and freedoms of one or more persons, the 
denial of access to a benefit or granting privilege only to some, without any 
objective and reasonable justification for doing so.” (CCC 2011b, 33)49 
  Furthermore, in T-051/11 the CCC ordered the non-application of a specific article 
of a national Law that conditioned the obligation to provide an interpreter of Colombian 
Sign Language [CSL], to a minimum number of students –ten- that must be enrolled in 
school. In that case, there was only three students who needed a CSL interpreter in the 
                                                        
47 Translation of my own  
48 T-051/11 (p. 46); T-551/11 (p.33) 
49 Translation of my own 
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school in question, thus the CCC considered that conditioning the provision of CSL 
interpreters for students constituted indirect discrimination as the Law, in a genuine attempt 
of countering discrimination, was in fact perpetuating exclusion (CCC 2011a, 46). 
  On the matter of exclusion, no change in criteria was found after ratification of the 
CRPD. Although the CCC makes reference to the prohibition of exclusion in cases before 
and after ratification, all statements are in the sense of recognizing exclusion as a form of 
discrimination. Before ratification of the CRPD, in 2006, the CCC recognized that 
exclusion of a child with disability from the educational system hinders their process of 
adaptability to society (CCC 2006, 20). Later, in a brief reckoning of inclusive educational 
systems around the world, the CCC recognized that inclusive education is the only system 
by which exclusion processes can be truly eradicated (CCC 2010c, 43).  
  After ratification, the CCC stated that financial planning, in terms or availability of 
resources, is of fundamental importance to guarantee that no student with disability is 
excluded from the general education system (CCC 2011a, 41-42). Also, the Court 
recognized that one of the conditions that foster exclusion of persons with disabilities from 
the educational system is the lack of physical accessibility of the environment, which 
hinders their possibility to achieve development to their fullest potential and pursue their 
aspirations (CCC 2011b, 31). Lastly, in 2013 the CCC ordered the Colombian State to 
adopt a public policy oriented to abolish all exclusionary practices and guarantee access to 
education in equality of opportunity to all (CCC 2013b, 39). 
C. Reasonable Accommodation 
  Before ratification of the CRPD, the CCC limits to mention that persons with 
disabilities have a right to reasonable accommodation, but makes no further analysis and, 
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in some cases, orders actions that constitute reasonable accommodations without 
acknowledging them as such. For example, in T-022/09 the ‘solutions’50 provided by the 
school to a student with a mobility impairment who complained about the new regulation 
that required her to move from one room to another several times a day, were considered 
by the CCC to be unfit for her needs, thus it suggested other measures that would suit not 
only her but other students. Nonetheless, the CCC did not recognize these ‘solutions’ as 
reasonable accommodations that the school is obligued to provide (CCC 2009). 
  It is only after ratification of the CRPD that the CCC starts analyzing whether or 
not the school should have provided any reasonable accommodation –acknowledged as 
such-, and if so, whether the State abided or not by its international and national obligations 
on the matter. Although, in only one sentence the CCC gives a definition of reasonable 
accommodation, adopting the one enshrined in the CRPD (CCC 2013a, 16). 
  However, the Court only applies a balancing test in one case and fails to do so, as 
the opportunity presented, in one more. In T-051/11 school denied a fulltime SCL 
interpreter to a student who is deaf-mute and instead proposed having a part-time 
interpreter due to lack of resources. While the CCC concluded that the proposed alternative 
was not ‘reasonable’ according to the student’s needs, no balancing test was applied. 
Nonetheless, the Court did make an analysis of undue burden and established that 
considering the assigned resources to attend students with disabilities and the need to 
include in the educational system 104 hard of hearing students, the Stated could have hired 
enough interpreters to fulfill the students’ needs, hence it did not represent an undue burden 
(CCC 2011a, 45-46). In another case, the CCC established that in order to determine the 
                                                        
50 The school suggested the use of a wheelchair –although her impairment did not required one-, the aid of 
her friends while changing rooms, and the occasional aid of a ‘school guardian’. 
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reasonableness of a measure and whether it represents and undue burden for the State, the 
authority must compare such measure with other alternatives in order to guarantee that it 
is the less severe measure that guards balance between human rights and availability of 
resources (CCC 2013a, 40). 
D. Accessibility (and the other 3 A’s: Availability, Adaptability, and Acceptability) 
  All seventeen decisions have, at least, one of these four characteristics mentioned 
or analyzed. What is very clear is that only post-CRPD ratification the CCC makes constant 
reference to such features as the “4 A’s” and makes them part of the “constitutionality 
block”. Analysis of accessibility was made in sixteen of the cases, the one in which the 
Court did not discuss any aspect of this feature was because there was no need of doing 
so51.  
  The CCC always recognized the right of every person to access education and the 
obligation of the State to provide access for all without discrimination, especially to 
persons with disabilities. Pre-ratification, the CCC established that the obligation to secure 
educational access for everyone goes beyond guaranteeing children physical access to a 
school, but it is essential that the State assure every child retains the skills they are taught. 
This means that the State must undertake the appropriate measures in order to achieve real 
and effective access to education, including access to different forms of communication, 
such as providing an interpreter for persons who are hard of hearing (CCC 2007b, 9-10).  
                                                        
51 In T-647/12 the CCC did not analyzed any of the 4 A’s because discussion was around whether or not the 
State should guarantee education for adults with disabilities, after the military forces of Colombia ceased 
payment of education for the daughter with disability of one of its retired members as soon as she turned 
eighteen. The CCC concluded that is unconstitutional and discriminatory to establish an age limit for the 
obligation to guarantee the right to education for vulnerable groups. Thus, age cannot be a justification for 
exclusion 
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  Also, the CCC acknowledged that accessibility is a fundamental condition of the 
right to education, thus denial of accessible transportation for considering that authorities 
are not obligued to provide that service when the educational institution is not public, 
infringes the full and effective enjoyment of this right (CCC 2008, 12). Additionally, in 
other case the CCC guaranteed accessibility, in equal conditions for everyone, to public 
spaces, facilities and buildings, inlcuding schools (CCC 2009, 13). 
  After ratification of the CRPD, the CCC continues to reiterate the above-mentioned 
criteria and expands in some cases its analysis. For example, the Court affirms that the right 
to education materializes, mainly, on the possibility of access to the public system; that 
such access must take into consideration the possibilities and needs of every individual; 
and, that public policy oriented to guarantee access for all must be developed around two 
main values: respect for diversity and the importance of an inclusive academic community 
(CCC 2011b, 19-26), Moreover, the CCC considers that the obligation of the State is not 
limited to ensure access in the “formal” sense, but in its “material” aspect, which includes 
making an analysis of the appropriate measures to guarantee effective exercise of the right 
to education for people with disabilities (Ibid, 41; CCC 2014, 20). 
  While there is no mention whatsover pre and post CRPD about “Universal Design” 
as a means to achieve full accessibility, the CCC constantly asserts that in order to do so 
State is compelled to consider everyone’s special needs so the outcomes of the the 
processes of learning and socialization are as similar as possible (CCC 2008, 10; 2009, 14; 
2010c, 28; 2010d, 13; 2012a, 22; 2013b, 31; 2015, 25). To do so, as stated before, schools 
must adapt to the needs of students with different social and cultural settings and make 
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available the necessary materials and properly trained teachers, in recognition that every 
child has a unique way of learning. 
  On the matter, the CCC refers to availability only in general a term, stating that 
education is a fundamental right that must be available to everyone. Nonetheless, there is 
no reference of specific traits of availability pre-CRPD. While there is one case where the 
CCC affirmed that the lack -for a period of time within the school cycle- of a trained teacher 
in CSL hampered a girl’s right to education, it makes no reference to the obligation of the 
state to have available trained teachers (CCC 2007b). Nonetheless, post-CRPD the CCC 
deepens into the analysis of availability in almost every judicial decision. In T-051/11, the 
CCC establishes that the effectiveness of the right to education is subject to compliance 
with the conditions of availability, thus the State has the obligation to design, produce and 
disseminate specialized educational materials, and strategically train and update teachers 
(CCC 2011a, 28-34). Specifically on the importance of providing students with teachers or 
interpreters knowledgeable in CSL, the Court stated: 
“The role of the Colombian Sign Language interpreter is fundamental for the 
educational process to be truly inclusive because that person plays the role of 
communicative mediator between the deaf and hearing communities, and 
facilitates access to information for deaf people in all educational spaces and 
linguistic modalities”52 (CCC 2011a, 38). 
Also, the CCC has emphasized on the importance of having, amongst the teaching staff, 
personnel with visual impairments: 
In a context in which there are still great difficulties in implementing the inclusive 
education model, the presence in an educational institution of a teacher who, by 
his blindness and expertise in Tiphlology53, is specifically trained to techa children 
with visual impairment, is an important step towards overcoming the gap between 
                                                        
52 Translation of my own 
53 According to the Merrian-Webster Dictionary, “typhlology” is the scientific study of blindness, its causes, 
effects and control. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/typhlology 
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the constitutional mandate to guarantee educational inclusion of children with 
disabilities and its effective implementation”54 (CCC 2013a, 27). 
  On adaptability, before ratification of the CRPD the CCC only mentioned 
adaptability as one of the obligatory traits of education, but no analysis was made, situation 
that changed after 2010. The CCC recognized that the educational system must be in a 
permanent process of adaptation to diversity, specifically in the case of disability, and 
celebrates the initiative of the school to adapt curricula to a student with a mental 
imapirment so she can advance in her education according to her potentialities (CCC 
2001b). Additionally, the Court recognices that without curricula adaptability is very 
difficult to close the gap of inequality and meet the challeges that inclusive education 
represent (CCC 2013a, 21). More generally, the CCC affirms that students have the right 
to be guaranteed access to effective education in terms of adaptability, for which States are 
not only required to provide simple access to an educational institution, but also take 
positive measures to ensure adaptability of materials, curricula, and other educational 
services (CCC 2014, 34). 
  Also on adaptability, the CCC has seldom analyzed the use of standardized test to 
assess abilities or intelligence. The Court had the opportunity to do so in one case pre-
CRPD where an educational institution classified students by level of disability –those who 
were susceptible of receiving education, and those who were not-. While the CCC 
recognized the importance of providing inclusive education to persons with disabilities and 
prohibited their exclusion form the general educational system, it still acknowledged the 
validity of tests that assess the ‘limitations’ of the students and the viability of their 
integration to the education system (CCC 2010a, 26).  
                                                        
54 Translation of my own 
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  This criterion does not change much after ratification of the CRPD. The CCC, in 
one occasion only, pronounced on standardized testing, concluding that their mere 
existence is not against the law. On this case, a student was denied accommodations to 
present the standardized test to enter the University of his choice and the CCC stated that 
while the examination is needed, the school should have take into consideration the specific 
needs of every applicant and provide them with the appropriate support. In sum, the Court 
affirmed: 
“[T]he aim is not to change the technical conditions of standardized assessment 
tests, but the exceptional needs of people who are being examined are taken into 
account in order to provide appropriate support, in accordance with the general 
parameters set by the Ministry of Education, specially the guidelines for providing 
education to students with disabilities, which harmonizes the fundamental rights 
to equality and non-discrimination and the obligation of ICFES to assess the 
quality of education in Colombia.”55 (CCC 2013b, 39) 
This means, that up until the end of 2015, the CCC has not moved towards considering 
standardized testing as a barrier to access education for people with disabilities.  
E. Equity and Equality 
  On this topic, there was no change of tendency on the CCC criteria or reasoning 
pre and post CRPD ratification, what it is observed is that the Court expands its standards 
on a more protective way. On the seventeen analyzed cases the Court recognized that 
education must be guaranteed in equality of opportunity, that everyone is equal before the 
law, and that persons with disabilities can access the judicial system in order to demand 
their rights and obtain reparations when they have been breached. The CCC develops its 
criterion on these matters based on the constitutional clause of equality, which guarantees 
special protection for children, protection that is reinforced when they have a disability. 
                                                        
55 Translation of my own 
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  On equality of opportunity, before ratification of the CRPD the CCC recognizes, 
generally, that the State has the immediate obligation to guarantee access to education in 
equality of opportunity for everyone, beginning with the selection processes –specifically 
in superior education-, and in distribution of quotas (CCC 2006, 16-17; 2015, 14). That to 
promote such conditions there is a need to provide a ‘privileged’ and ‘qualified’ treatment, 
better said, to implement affirmative actions (CCC 2007b, 6; 2010b, 11; 2012a, 15; 2013b, 
24). Moreover, equality of opportunity will ensure students with disabilities equal 
treatment and the provision of services that will allow them to achieve the maximum 
development of their skills and potential, which will facilitate their social integration (CCC 
2009, 10). For this reason, a lack of properly trained teachers –in Braille, for example- in 
a school is a violation of the right to education for not providing equal opportunities for 
everyone (CCC 2010d, 2). 
  After ratification, some of the above-mentioned standards are emphasized by the 
CCC and expanded in other ways. For example, the Court recognizes equality of 
opportunity as a fundamental principle of the right to education, alongside with 
effectiveness, continuance, quality, and others (CCC 2011a, 17-18; 2013b, 12). 
Additionally, the CCC states that equality of opportunity entails the obligations for the 
State to provide educational services on an equal basis and under consideration of the 
‘special conditions’ needed by students with impairments, so that their learning and 
socialization processes are as equally as possible as to those of students without 
impairments (CCC 2012a, 15). Also, for the first time, the CCC acknowledges that the way 
to ensure access to quality education in equality of opportunity is through the inclusive 
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approach (ibid, 16) and, at the same time, the means for persons with disabilities to achieve 
maximum enjoyment of other rights and full participation in society (CCC 2013b, 18).  
  In most of the analyzed decisions the facts of the case had to do with the lack of 
equality of opportunity provided to the students, for which the CCC made the 
corresponding analysis of equality before the law recognizing that everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to access the judicial system to claim their rights. It is important 
to note that one of the main purposes of the CCC in reviewing tutela actions56 is to achieve 
material justice through ordering reparations, and unify criterion on the interpretation of 
fundamental rights (CCC 2007, 8). Thus, in the seventeen sentences studied the CCC 
ordered reparations to redress violations of the right to inclusive education. 
  For example, regarding the non-discrimination clause, equality and accessibility, 
the CCC ordered the admittance of students that were excluded from the general 
educational system for not opening special quotas for students with disabilities (CCC 
2006), for ending the program that provided the student with the necessary support (CCC 
2008), and for not providing special financial aid for persons with disabilities (CCC 
2011b). In a case where the CCC orders ‘special’ education after a thorough evaluation of 
the applicant’s disability, the Court states that in the circumstance that there is no space 
available in the public school, the State must pay for a private institution to provide 
education (CCC 2007a; 2015). Also, the Court orders the reinstatement of a professor with 
a visual impairment to both guarantee his rights and the rights of his students with 
disabilities to have a trained teacher (CCC 2013a).  
                                                        
56 Also known as: “writ of protection of constitutional rights”, “right of injunction”, “writ of injunction”, 
“writ of protection”, “tutelage action” or “acción de tutela” (in Spanish). It is the legal action that can be 
invoked to protect fundamental rights enshrined in the Colombian Constitution. 
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  On reasonable accommodations, the CCC orders the State to hire a professor 
knowledgeable in CSL (CCC 2007b; 2014), to provide with accessible public 
transportation to a girl in order to attend school (CCC 2008), to hire professionals on 
psychology and physiotherapy as support or a student with disability (CCC 2010b), and to 
hire a teacher prepared in autism spectrum disorder to support a student inside the regular 
classroom (CCC 2012a).  
  More generally, before ratification of the CRPD, the CCC orders to adopt the 
necessary measures to guarantee educational policies in favor of people with disabilities 
(CCC 2010a), to harmonize all institutions that provide any kind of services to people with 
disabilities in order to ensure that education is delivered under an integral perspective (CCC 
2010b), to provide information to all educational institutions and society about the 
importance of the principles of reasonable accommodation and participation of persons 
with disabilities (CCC 2010c). After ratification, the CCC mandates to adopt planning, 
programming, and budgetary measures to ensure real and effective access to education, as 
well as the modification of several articles of a Presidential Decree that promotes indirect 
discrimination in educational settings against persons with disabilities (CCC 2011a). The 
Court also emphasizes on the importance of creating public policy specifically to guarantee 
reasonable accommodations (CCC 2013b). 
F. Other Principles of Inclusive Education 
  It is pretty identifiable the moment in which the CCC starts to guarantee inclusive 
education as the approach that best fulfills the right to education for people with disabilities. 
While Colombia ratified the CRPD on May 2011, changes on judicial decisions can be 
spotted since 2010, when the Law 1346 that harmonized national legislation with CRPD 
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was approved. From 2006 to 2009 the CCC did not recognize the right to have a 
personalized education fit for each student’s needs, nor that inclusive education is the 
appropriate model. On the contrary, it emphasizes that persons with disabilities must be 
granted education in integrated spaces (CCC 2006, 18-19), and confuses and uses 
indistinctly the words ‘inclusion’ and ‘integration’ to refer to the latter (CCC 2007a, 14).  
  This began to change in 2010, after the harmonization of the CRPD into national 
Law. Although in 2011, the CCC determined that the “the shortcomings of the current 
policy on inclusive education, make insufficient the guarantee of the right to education of 
people with disabilities” (CCC 2011a, 48). Nonetheless, the shift in judicial criterion is 
pretty clear as the CCC started to recognize that education is indivisible from human 
dignity because of its quality depends the level of inclusion in society (CCC 2010a, 26; 
2010d, 10; 2011b, 19). Also, the Court began to make reference to previous discriminatory 
approaches such as ‘special education’ and integration practices (CCC 2011b, 21-22; 
2012a, 18-21; 2013a, 18-20; 2013b, 27-29).  
  Moreover, ever since decision T-899/10, the Court is very clear on the fact that 
‘special education’ must be a last resource that shall be ordered through the tutela action 
only after medical and psychological valuations, and the family opinions, considers it as 
the best option for the child and the only way to guarantee its right to education (CCC 
2010b, 11; 2010c, 38; 2010d, 14; 2011a, 32; 2012b, 24; 2015, 25). Additionally, the CCC 
established that the fundamental right to education means that the educational system must 
follow an inclusive model, thus inclusive education is a right of everyone, not just of person 
with disabilities (CCC 2011b, 21-22; 2012a, 16; 2013a, 19; 2013b, 25; 2014, 20; 2015, 23). 
Specifically, the Court expressed:  
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“As for the so-called inclusive education, the Court has indicated that it is the 
commitment of various international instruments -which has also been welcomed 
by the National Ministry of Education- and ‘seeks to broaden the spectrum of 
inclusion of people with special educational needs special, beyond access to 
regular school. Inclusive education seeks to abolish segregated environments, so 
all children, regardless of their educational needs, can study and learn together.’ 
[…] Inclusive education is set as the ideal mechanism to achieve transformation 
of the education system for it to respond to the diversity of students.”57 (CCC 
2013b, 25-26; 2015, 22-23). 
Even in some decisions, the Court recounts inclusive educational policies and experiences 
of other countries such as Canada, Argentina and the European Union (CCC 2010c, 40-44; 
2013b, 26).  
  Contrary to what the Court mandated in previous decisions and advancing in 
recognizing the importance of personalized education, the CCC specifically started to 
reject integration policies and established that education for persons with disabilities should 
be in regular classrooms with individualized plans (CCC 2010d, 13; 2011a, 26; 2011b, 38; 
2012a, 17; 2013b, 26; 2015, 22). The CCC acknowledged that not all disabilities are equal, 
and even when they are the needs of every student are different, therefore adopting a “one 
size fits all” educational policy instead of a personalized education is discriminatory (CCC 
2013b, 39). Additionally, the Court affirms that the educational system must adapt and be 
prepared to respond to every educational need of all learners, considering the particularities 
of each case and taking into account all of their capabilities and talents, so that the learning 
process suits their conditions and can be accessible to anyone (CCC 2014, 20-21). 
  What remains a constant in all seventeen sentences is the recognition of education 
as a fundamental right that must be aimed to develop fullest human potential, and enable 
people with disabilities to participate in society; as well as the obligation of the State to 
guarantee access, permanence and progress in the educational system. While pre-CRPD 
                                                        
57 Translation of my own 
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the CCC only refers to such obligations as general characteristics of the right to education, 
after ratification the Court recognizes that the only way to achieve those purposes is 
through inclusive education (CCC 2011a, 16; 2011b, 41-42; 2012a, 15; 2013b, 27; 2014, 
21-22; 2015, 19-23). Additionally, the CCC affirmed that when permanence on the general 
system is not guaranteed due to lack of trained teachers or reasonable accommodations 
then implicitly the student has been excluded (CCC 2007, 9). In response, the State must 
avert these situations within its educational coverage plan and design a service that 
guarantee continuance and permanence in the system for persons with disabilities (CCC 
2008, 12).  
  Also, the CCC established that public policy on how to ensure access, permanence 
and progress to higher education of persons with disabilities should develop within two 
lines of action: respect for diversity and the importance of an inclusive academic 
community (CCC 2011b, 26). The Court reinforces this criterion by sustaining that the 
effectiveness of the permanence principle can only be guarded by including students with 
disabilities in regular classrooms (CCC 2013, 27; 2014, 26; 2015, 23).  
G. Other barriers 
With regards to the three indicators used to identify other barriers, the most 
identifiable change is in the use of discriminatory language in the judicial decisions. In the 
pre-CRPD sentences the CCC commonly uses outdated terms such as ‘disabled’, 
‘handicapped’, ‘mental retardation’, ‘persons with limitations’, ‘normal schools’, and 
‘normal students’. Nonetheless, this changes after judgment T-974/10 when the Court 
shifts the above-mentioned terms for ‘persons with disabilities’. In this decision, the Court 
dedicates an entire section to explain how a change of perspective on disability –going 
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from perceiving it as a disease to a condition that does not define the person, thus adopting 
the social model of disability- requires a change of language (CCC 2010c, 30). 
 Although no pre-CRPD decision fails to understand, in its generalities, the human 
rights model of disability as they all recall international instruments in the matter as part of 
the ‘constitutionality block’, judgment T-974/10 is the first one to mark the threshold of 
explicitly including an analysis of the social model on disability and the human rights 
paradigm as part of the decision. This opened the door for further criterion of the CCC on 
the matter. For example, the Court recognized that the effects of impairment in a person 
depends, on great scale, from the social environment, thus negative settings turn 
impairments into disabilities (CCC 2011b, 30-31; 2014, 14). The CCC further expands and 
explains that the change from a medical to a social model and human rights paradigm 
implies: (1) that disability is the result of the exclusion of the person from participation in 
society; and (2) exclusion is not impossible to eradicate (CCC 2013a, 16). 
 However, the CCC admits that in order to achieve full inclusion there are a lot of 
barriers that State and society need to overcome, one of which are attitudinal barriers. On 
the matter, there is no mention whatsoever of the role negative attitudes, stigmatization or 
stereotypes play in discrimination against people with disabilities and, more specifically, 
in their exclusion of the general educational system. It is only after 2010 that the CCC starts 
to recognize that there are still present some practices, obstacles and prejudices that impede 
persons with disabilities access to education (CCC 2011a, 41). Specifically, the Court 
acknowledged that people with disabilities have been invisible to the Government and 
society due to a high level of ignorance, prejudices, negligence and discomfort generated 
by disability (CCC 2015, 13). Therefore, violations to the right of equality and non-
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discrimination in the context of education may originate in the use of language in norms 
and regulations, or in other practices adopted by the institutions and their communities that 
unjustifiably become a way of life and are naturally accepted, which perpetuates exclusion 
(CCC 2011b, 33).  
The CCC admits that while there has been advancement in inclusive practices no 
educational institution has managed to eradicate pedagogic practices that still view 
disability as an ‘abnormality’, which has created a huge gap between what is said and done 
(CCC 2013a, 20). The Court strongly advises that in order to overcome attitudinal barriers 
it must be carried out awareness campaigns -about the living conditions and needs of 
people with disabilities- throughout the academic community (CCC 2011b, 25), as well as 
throughout the entire society and most relevantly amongst the competent authorities to 
make the process of inclusive education possible (CCC 2015, 14). 
3. Conclusions 
In general, the CCC has advance in the recognition of inclusive education as a right 
for persons with disabilities, as well as in the establishment of standards that are pulled out 
but go beyond the national laws that regulate the educational system. What is very 
interesting from the Colombian case is that the process of harmonization of their national 
framework took place prior to the ratification of the CRPD. That is, after signing the 
Convention but before ratification, the government enacted a Law that adopted in its 
entirety the CRPD, which turned out to be the real threshold for the changes identified in 
the CCC’s rulings. Thus, at this point, whereas it was the act of ratification on itself which 
impacted the protection of the right to education or not, has little importance. What should 
be noted is that it was indeed the adoption of the CRPD –through a national law- that really 
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This chapter presents the analysis of the judicial decisions of the National Supreme 
Court of Justice of Mexico (SCJN) from 2001 to 2015 in which it is ruled on the right to 
education of persons with disability. First, it is determined the framework of the right to 
education for persons with disabilities to which Mexico must abide; second, based on the 
conceptual framework, an analysis of the decisions is presented by topic in order to explain 
the Court’s tendency, regression or advancement on the protection and promotion of the 
mentioned right; third, some general conclusions are drawn from the analysis.  
1. National framework 
  As opposed to many countries in the world, Mexico has a constitutional right to 
free and compulsory education. The Constituent Assembly of 1917 considered education 
a crucial and fundamental aspect of the supreme law (Sánchez and Cardona 2006, 73), 
therefore Article 3 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States [PCUMS] 
establishes the duty of the Federation and States to provide every individual with free pre-
school, primary and secondary education. Additionally, Article 1 prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of disability. 
  Mexico has signed and ratified many human rights international treaties. 
Specifically, Mexico signed the CRPD on March 30th, 2007 –the same day it was opened 
for signature- after playing an important role pushing for its adoption. Later that year, on 
December 17th, 2007 the Mexican Government ratified the CRPD with an interpretative 
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declaration that was further withdrawn in 2012.58 It is important to note that with the 2011 
Human Rights Amendments to the Constitution, the rights established in every 
international treaty to which the Mexican State is party were incorporated to the 
Constitution59. Therefore, human rights were elevated to the highest level of protection, 
creating the obligation for every authority to adopt and enforce international human rights 
standards, always guided by the pro homine principle.  
  Although the PCUMS does not mandate a specific model of education, there are 
other national obligations created by its legislature that give elements as to how the right 
to education must be fulfilled. In 2003, the Federal Act on the Prevention and Elimination 
of Discrimination (Congreso de la Unión 2003) was adopted, prohibiting any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction based on disability. The General Act on the Inclusion of Persons 
with Disabilities (Congreso de la Unión 2011) and the General Act of Education (Congreso 
de la Unión, 1993) -last reformed in June 2016- envisions an educational system without 
                                                        
58 On January 3rd, 2012, the Government of the United Mexican States informed the Secretary-General that 
it had decided to withdraw the interpretative declaration made upon ratification to paragraph 2 of article 12 
of the Convention. 
59 The reform was published in the Official National Gazette on June 10, 2011. The first three paragraphs 
read as follow:  
“In the United Mexican States, all individuals shall be entitled to the human rights granted by this 
Constitution and the international treaties signed by the Mexican State, as well as to the guarantees for the 
protection of these rights. Such human rights shall not be restricted or suspended, except for the cases and 
under the conditions established by this Constitution itself.  
The provisions relating to human rights shall be interpreted according to this Constitution and the 
international treaties on the subject, working in favor of the broader protection of people at all times.  
All authorities, in their areas of competence, are obliged to promote, respect, protect and guarantee Human 
Rights, in accordance with the principles of universality, interdependence, indivisibility and progressiveness. 
As a consequence, the State must prevent, investigate, penalize and rectify violations to Human Rights, 
according to the law.” 
For English version of the PCUMS, see Constitute Project, “Mexico’s Constitution of 1917 with 
Amendments through 2015”, Available at:  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015.pdf?lang=en 
For more information on the Constitutional Reform, see: Collí Ek, Víctor Manuel. "Improving Human Rights 
in Mexico: Constitutional Reforms, International Standards, and New Requirements for Judges." Human 
Rights Brief. Vol. 20, no. 1 (2012): 7-14. Available at:  
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1850&context=hrbrief 
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discrimination. More recently, in April 2014, the National Program on Development and 
Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities 2014-2018 was signed by the President to align the 
national strategies with the international commitments.  
  Although these acts and programs recognize a right to education for people with 
disabilities and establish a national system for their “development and integration into 
society” (CmRPD 2013, para. 11) they still acknowledge special education as the means 
towards an independent life and academic equality for people with disabilities. 
Nonetheless, a very recent reform to the General Act of Education was made in order to 
harmonize it with the CRPD and guarantee inclusive education (DOF 2016). Specifically, 
the Law was modified to guarantee equality of opportunity in the access, permanence and 
progress in the educational system; to recognize the value of diversity and a culture of 
inclusion; to order the elaboration and actualization of accessible materials; to order that 
any new school building must be physically accessible; and, to guarantee teacher training 
to promote inclusive environments. Nonetheless, it still affirms that education for people 
with disabilities must be “special” but in inclusive settings, failing to establish an obligation 
to guarantee inclusive education to everyone without distinction.  
2. Analysis of the judicial decisions of the National Supreme Court of Justice of 
Mexico  
For the period established between 2001 and 2015 only three decisions were found 
that serve the purpose of this investigation60. What specifically stands out of the Mexican 
                                                        
60To narrow down the decisions of the SCJN to the topic of interest, different combination of search terms 
were used to make sure no case was left out. ‘Inclusive education’ and ‘disability’ was the first try with No 
results found; ‘inclusive’, ‘education’ AND ‘disability’ threw out no matches; ‘right to education’ AND 
‘disability’ had 3 cases; ‘special education’ AND ‘disability’ cast out no decisions at all; other combinations 
including the words ‘education’, ‘disability’, ‘CRPD’, ‘discrimination on the basis of disability’, among other 
terms, were also used in the research tool with no results whatsoever. 
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case is that no judicial decisions were found before the ratification of the CRPD. On the 
contrary, after accession the Court ruled in only three cases: AI 54/2009 (SCJN 2013), AI 
86/2009 (SCJN 2015a), and AD 35/2014 (SCJN 2015b).  
  For a better understanding of the analysis, brief descriptions of the facts of each 
case are presented:  
- AI 54/2009: the National Commission of Human Rights [CNDH] presented an 
Action of Unconstitutionality 61  against diverse local authorities of the State of 
Colima for the enactment of the State Law that regulates Day Care Centers [Colima 
Law], which allegedly violated the Constitution, the Inter-American Convention on 
the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities 
[IACPD] and the then General Act on Disability62. Specifically, against the articles 
that discriminated against people with disabilities by excluding them of the right to 
access these Centers because of the differentiation made between ‘dependent 
disabled’ children from those who are not, breaching their right to education. 
- AI 86/2009: the facts are similar to AI 54/2009 as the CNDH again presented an 
Action of Unconstitutionality against local authorities of the State of Baja California 
for the enactment of the Act of Public Health of the State of Baja California [Baja 
California Law] that establishes the requirements that the Day Care Centers must 
meet to operate, in violation of the Constitution and the IACPD. Similar to the case 
above, the Law catalogues disability into ‘dependent’ and ‘non-dependent’ disabled 
                                                        
61 A judicial proceeding that can be brought before the SCJN by which legislative minorities, the Federal 
Attorney General, political parties and the CNDH, can challenge the constitutionality of a statute law passed 
by federal and state legislatures, within 30 days of its ratification. 
62 Now, the General Act on the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities (Congreso de la Unión 2011) 
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children, discriminating against persons with disabilities for allowing exclusion 
practices in educational settings.  
- AD 35/2014: The mother of a child victim of scholar bullying sues the State in civil 
proceedings for monetary compensation for the psychological damage caused to her 
son by a teacher and other classmates by continuously assaulting him physical and 
psychologically. The child, who was 7 years old at the time of the harassment, had 
been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder [ADHD], which is not 
considered by the SCJN as a disability but, for analysis purposes, considers it as such 
in order to grant him protection under a protected category of discrimination.  
  The results of the analysis were systematized by topic as further explained. At this 
point is important to note, as mentioned above, that no judicial decisions were found prior 
to the ratification of the CRPD, thus the analysis is made based only on the rulings emitted 
post-2007 and it involves whether or not there have been any changes within those rulings.  
A. Conventional control 
  The Human Rights Constitutional Reform of 2011 gave all judges the duty to apply 
a conventional and constitutional control in every decision that entails fundamental rights. 
Accordingly, since 2011 judges nationwide must cite and analyze the applicable 
international human rights treaties in order to guard the pro homine principle and apply the 
most favorable law in benefit of all the individuals. Nonetheless, from the three decisions 
studied only one -AI 86/2009- cites the CRPD, and specifically Article 24, but no further 
analysis of its implication on the case is made.  
  It is important to mention that the SCJN made an interest shift on this matter, if we 
look at the two similar cases reviewed within a timeframe of two years. On AI 54/2009, 
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ruled on the 21st of November 2013, the Court made no mention at all of the CRPD, 
although it did make a conventional control of the Law in question with the IACPD. But, 
on February 15th, 2015 when ruling on the Action of Unconstitutionality 86/2009, the SCJN 
uses the CRPD to interpret what it means discrimination on the basis of disability. It 
reproduces the CRPD text in relation to articles 1 to 7 and Article 24 in order to make a 
conventional control of the Baja California Law and decide whether or not the distinction 
between ‘dependent disabled’ and ‘non-dependent disabled’ was conventional and 
constitutional or not. While the SCJN did not declared a violation to the CRPD, it did affirm 
that the introduction of " non-dependent " qualifier is incompatible with the Constitution, 
in accordance with articles 1, 4, 5 and 7 of the CRPD (SCJN 2015a, para. 81). What stands 
out is that the SCJN leaves out of this declaration Article 24 of the CRPD. 
B. Non-discrimination 
  The SCJN used only in AI 86/2009 a definition of “discrimination on the basis of 
disability”. In that case, recognizing the recommendation made by the Inter-American 
Committee for the Elimination of al forms of Discrimination against People with 
Disabilities [IACmPD] of adopting into its national legislation the definitions on disability 
and discrimination on the basis of disability (SCJN 2015a, para. 70) IACmPD 2010, pg. 
20), the SCJN uses the definition of “discrimination against persons with disabilities” as 
enshrined in Article 2 of the IACPD.  
  In AD 35/2014 the SCJN accepts that bullying can constitute a form of 
discrimination when it is perpetuated against someone who belongs to a group protected 
by the non-discrimination clause (SCJN 2015b, 31). While ADHD is not a disability, the 
Court decided to expand its protection and considered that the bullying occurred for a 
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reason related to disability as it was in response to some of the ADHD behaviors the child 
presented, thus the child was discriminated against by his teacher and classmates (Ibid, 36) 
which hindered his right to education as the child decided to skip school because of the 
harassment he suffered. Then, the SCJN established that schools are compelled to provide 
reinforced protection to students with disabilities in attention of their susceptibility to suffer 
from some kind of discrimination (Ibid, 42). 
  In the three decisions the SCJN recognizes non-discrimination as a fundamental 
principle of immediate application. Moreover, in both Actions of Unconstitutionality the 
Court affirms that exclusion is a form of discrimination, thus it is a practice that is 
prohibited by the PCUMS and international human rights instruments (SCJN 2013, 18; 
2015, 91). The Court concludes that cataloguing disabilities in ‘dependent’ and ‘non-
dependent’ impacts negatively in the access to education for people with disabilities by 
reinforcing exclusionary practices within a group that has been traditionally excluded from 
society (SCJN 2013, 8; 2015a, para. 50-51). In that sense, the use of the concept ‘dependent 
disability’ -to refer to those who cannot access to education- opens the door to the 
possibility to an arbitrary conduct from school authorities to deny access to anyone whom 
they consider needs additional support for learning (SCJN 2015a, 14).    
  Additionally, the Court acknowledges that not all distinction constitutes 
discrimination, and that governments must rely on affirmative actions and “treating 
unequal the unequals” (2015a, para. 58; 2015b, 62) to guarantee equality and non-
discrimination on the educational system. In that sense, the SCJN argues that the 
differentiation of ‘dependent’ and ‘non-dependent’ disabilities is indeed a form of denial 
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of the right to education for people with disabilities that cannot be considered as justified 
discrimination. On the matter, the SCJN acknowledges that: 
“[N]ot every unequal treatment violates guarantees, but only when it produces a 
distinction between objective and indeed equal situations, without it having an 
equally reasonable and objective justification; therefore, to equal factual 
circumstances correspond similar legal situations, because the legislator has no 
prohibition in law to establish unequal treatment, unless this is contrived or 
unjustified.”63 (SCJN 2015a, para. 54) 
In that sense, the Court applied a conventionality control in order to assess whether the 
distinction met the requirements of proportionality –between the unequal treatment given 
and the intended purpose- reasonableness and necessity. The SCJN concluded that the 
phrase ‘dependent disability’ is not a reasonable distinction because the disadvantages of 
excluding those who are classified as “dependable” outweigh the advantages of accepting 
those who are “non-dependable” (Ibid, para. 67). Also, the Court considered that given that 
the CRPD and other international instruments do not distinguish between types of 
disability, it would not be in accordance with the pro homine principle if the SCJN would 
do so (para. 68). 
  Another interesting finding between the Actions of Unconstitutionality is that only 
in AI 86/2009 the SCJN recognizes indirect forms of discrimination, while in the previous 
action it did not. The Court cites the CmRDP and recalls that “a law which is applied in a 
neutral manner may have a discriminatory effect when the particular circumstances of the 
individuals to whom it is applied are not taken into consideration” (SCJN 2015a, para 72), 
thus in its application the Baja California Law would be discriminatory as it allows all day 
care centers to deny access arguing that they are not equipped to provide service to anyone 
with “special needs”. 
                                                        
63 Translation of my own 
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C. Reasonable accommodation 
  In none of the three judicial decisions reviewed was found any analysis of 
reasonable accommodation, even when the opportunity was presented. For example, in the 
Actions of Unconstitutionality where the Baja California Law and the Colima Law 
excluded ‘dependent disabilities’ from the day care centers because there are ‘specialized’ 
centers where they can receive the ‘special attention’ they need, the Court could have 
referred to the importance of providing reasonable accommodations that foster inclusive 
settings since early childhood, but did not. In AI 86/2009 the SCJN only referred to 
reasonable accommodation as it reproduced parts of the CRPD, such as articles 2, 5 and 
24, but no analysis was made.  
D. Accessibility (and the other 3 A’s: Availability, Adaptability, and Acceptability) 
  There are very few criterion set by the SCJN on this matter. In AI 54/2009 the Court 
completely ignores the fact that the Colima Law denies access to education and makes no 
mention at all of the importance of guaranteeing accessibility. On the contrary, AI 86/2009 
the SCJN affirms that local authorities must guarantee accessibility for all; in order to do 
so State is compelled to consider everyone’s special needs so the outcomes of the the 
processes of learning and socialization are as similar as possible, thus the State should 
provide the day care centers and their students with the necessary tools so everyone can 
attend to ‘regular’ classrooms (SCJN 2015a, 14). 
  Moreover, the SCJN,  in attention to a recommendation made by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child [CmRC], pointed out that all new public buildings –including 
schools and day care centers- should comply with international specifications for 
accessibility of persons with disabilities, and that existing public buildings should be 
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modified, to the extent it is feasible, to make them as accessible as possible (ibid, para. 71). 
Also, the SCJN cites the CRPD on the definition of ‘universal design’, and establishes that 
the social model of disability aims to social inclusion based on independent living, non-
discrimination and universal accessibility in all activities, such as economy, politics and 
education (Ibid, para. 61). 
E. Equity and Equality 
  The SCJN recognizes that education must be granted in equality of opportunity for 
everyone. In that sense, the Court asserts that the social model of disability has the aim to 
achieve not only formal equality –which concerns equal treatment and the absence of 
discrimination-, but also material equity that characterizes by the introduction of 
‘inequalities’ –or positive discrimination- that acknowledge the different circumstances 
and context of every person (SCJN 2015a, 61; 2015b, 40). Therefore, to guarantee equality 
of opportunity, the Court proclaims that States need to generate spaces where openness, 
tolerance and equitable education are promoted (SCJN 2015b, 40).  
  Additionally, the SCJN cites the Constitutional Court of Colombia and recognizes 
that States are compelled to provide educational services on an equal basis and under 
consideration of the ‘special conditions’ needed by students with impairments, so that their 
learning and socialization processes are as equally as possible as to those of students 
without impairments (SCJN 2015a, 14) Nonetheless, the SCJN affirms that to protect the 
right to education governments must ensure that it is provided with equity but in integrated 
spaces (SCJN 2015b, 40), which is considered by the international community as a form 
of segregation. 
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  None of the cases analyzed presented the Court with the opportunity to pronounce 
on equality before the law for people with disabilities, two of them because of the nature 
of the judicial proceeding, and the other one because the victim of bullying was underage. 
However, the SCJN did order reparations were breaches on fundamental rights were 
found64. For example, after declaring that the categorization of “dependent” and “non-
dependent” disabilities was found unjustified, the Court declared the unconstitutionality of 
the article of the Baja California Law containing such concepts, and ordered the adoption 
of a new wording for that article that not only does not exclude, but explicitly include 
people with disabilities. This, argues the SCJN, generates an inclusive condition for people 
with disabilities in the day care centers, regardless of their disability (SCJN 2015a, para. 
87).  
  In the bullying case, the SCJN ordered the school to pay five hundred thousand 
mexican pesos in compensation for moral damages caused to the child, after being 
harrassed by his teacher for being diagnosed with ADHD, as well as to absorb the cost of 
any number f psychological therapy the child might need. The Court recongnized that these 
types of reparations have a detterent effect to future actions, therefore, the sum imposed 
should be reasonable enough to satisfy the purpose of repair but also to deter (SCJN 2015b, 
91).  
 
                                                        
64 Only in AI 52/2009 the Court did not order reparations. Instead, it declared the definitive dismissal of the 
proceeding as the act that activated the action was already extinct. That is, months before the ruling the 
Colima Law was overturned by a new one.    
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F. Other principles of Inclusive Education 
  The SCJN makes very reserved assertions on inclusive education. What it does is 
to recognize, generally, that the right to education entails the obligation to guarantee access, 
permanence and progress to high quality education, and that it is the means for a person to 
participate in society and achieve its fullest potential. On the matter, the SCJN 
acknowledges education as an indispensable right to realize other human rights (SCJN 
2015b, 74), and, citing the CCC, recognizes that  
“Thanks to the existence and protection of the right to education, other rights, 
values and princles, such as equality, dignity, good name, freedom to choose a 
profession or trade, the free development of personality, civic participation, work, 
the minimum vital, among others, can develop and coexist.” (Ibid, 33) 
Moreover, the SCJN establishes that the purpose of education is to empower the person, 
develop his or her skills and capacity to the fullest potential, and boost their self-esteem 
and self-confidence (Ibid, 34). 
  The SCJN consents that inclusion is important at all ages, especially when it is 
fostered at a very early stage in people with disabilities, maximizing the benefits (SCJN 
2015a, para. 75). Nonetheless, the SCJN avoids setting standards that promote inclusive 
settings and limits its affirmations to establish that education is the main means to achieve 
and effective and efficient integration of society (SCJN 2015b, 78); thus, people with 
disabilities must be provided equal education in integrated spaces so they can learn the 
values that would allow them to live in society (Ibid, 41). 
G. Other barriers  
  In regards to the elements identified in this study as ‘other barriers’, neither of the 
decisions analyzed used discriminatory language nor did recognize attitudinal barriers. At 
most, the SCJN acknowledged in AI 86/2009 that disability is the result of the interaction 
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between impairment and the existing social barriers (SCJN 2015a, para. 61), without any 
further information as to the different types of barriers that a person with disability can 
encounter in his or her daily life. Moreover, the SCJN could have expanded, at least on the 
bullying case, on the effect that attitudinal barriers have on the access to education. 
Specially, since the SCJN did acknowledge that scholar bullying is perpetuated more 
frequently and severely against persons with disabilities -making punctual reference to 
those who are diagnosed with ADHD-, often causing social exclusion and altering the 
conditions of their education to the point of hindering their access to educational 
opportunities (SCJN 2015b, 36-39 and 45).   
  Only in AI 86/2009 was found a description and analysis of what the social model 
of disability involves, recognizing that such approach is promoted by the CRPD. While 
only in that decision was found clear evidence suggesting that the SCJN is acknowledging 
and moving towards a human rights model, the other two rulings present no indications of 
going backwards; at least not in the respect of the interpretation of disability. 
3. Conclusions  
It is difficult to conclude that there is enough evidence to state that the ratification 
of the CRPD represented a threshold in the SCJN jurisprudence for the recognition of the 
right to education of persons with disabilities as it is enshrined in Article 24 of the CRPD 
and other international standards. First, because there are not enough cases to establish 
such conclusion; second, because no judicial decisions were found prior to the ratification 
of the CRPD, which made impossible a before-after comparison. Thus the analysis 
concentrated on whether the SCJN has made any progress from the first case reviewed 
concerning education of people with disabilities in 2013 to the last one in 2015. Although 
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it is a very short period of time in which tendencies could be observed, some changes in 
specific indicators could actually be identified and some general conclusions may be 
drawn.  
Overall, it seems that the SCJN is not yet ready to set criterion as to affirming that 
inclusive education must be the approach to follow in order to guarantee the right to 
education for everyone. New legislation and the SCJN still consider ‘special education’ not 
only viable but also appropriate. On the upside, the Court made important highlights on the 
importance of adopting a social model of disability; it made clear that no differentiation 
between types or degree of disabilities is allowed, especially when providing access to 
education; and, in just a lapse of two years between the decisions of two very similar cases, 
the SCJN recognized that legislation can have a indirect discriminatory effect on the right 







The study was set up to explore the extent to which judiciary systems participate in 
the protection of the right to education for people with disabilities, specially under the 
considerations made in article 24 of the Convention on the Rights for Persons with 
Disabilities. It also has sought to compare the decisions of three Courts –the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, and the National Supreme 
Court of Mexico- to know the direction in which countries are moving in order to achieve 
inclusive education for all. Thus, the research pretended to answer the question: to what 
extent has the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
[CRPD] has impacted judicial decisions on inclusive education in Mexico, Colombia and 
the European Union? 
 The main finding is that the ratification of the CRPD boosted the role of the 
judiciaries of all three parties to the CRPD in the protection and expansion of the rights of 
people with disabilities, especially the right to inclusive education. Yet, the extent of their 
general contributions has been somewhat similar but also different. For example, the CCC 
has had much more opportunities to review the characteristics of the right to an inclusive 
education, which has led to the establishment of more –and more progressive- criterion 
than the Mexican and European judges. On the contrary, the SCJN and ECtHR have been 
the more ‘conservative’ –so to put it out somehow- than Colombia, and also the ones with 
considerably less jurisprudence on the matter. The latter may be attributed to the nature of 
the judicial proceedings that can be brought before the courts, being the Colombian tutela 
action the most accessible.  
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 Specific findings are summarized and compared, in the following paragraphs, 
within the respective indicators used for the analysis. First, on ‘conventional control’ the 
impact of the ratification of the CRPD is only clear in the Colombian case, where the CCC 
used Article 24 of the CRPD as part of the constitutionality block used to solve the tutelas. 
On the contrary, the SCJN and ECtHR failed to do so in a consistent form, which can only 
be interpreted that not all judges within the courts are willing to use the CRPD as the 
minimum standard of protection. Although the CCC and SCJN have the faculty to 
determine violations to a norm, none of the Courts have yet done so.  
 Second, one of the indicators in which the CRPD impacted the most on judicial 
decisions was on the ‘non-discrimination clause’. Although the three parties have disability 
as a protected category of discrimination, there is a tendency –though not much 
consolidated- on the three Courts to recognize the definition of ‘discrimination on the basis 
of disability’ as it is enshrined in the CRPD. Also, there is a clear shift since ratification, 
within the CCC and SCJN at least, on explicitly prohibiting exclusion of persons with 
disabilities of the educational system. What appears to have no connection at all with the 
endorsement of the CRPD are the Courts’ arguments on the possibility of a justified 
discrimination –as all three acknowledge the need for affirmative actions- and the existence 
of indirect discrimination.  
 Third, in my opinion, on the matter of ‘reasonable accommodation’ is were the 
three Courts fallen shortly on their criterion. Perhaps because some rulings did not directly 
needed any standards set, as the facts of the cases did not revolve on the matter; but maybe, 
also because the Courts are not ready yet to expand on a topic that, in most of the cases, 
require resources that might not always be available. On the specific cases of the ECtHR 
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and SCJN, the Courts limited to refer to the obligation of providing reasonable 
accommodation, but completely ignored the opportunities that were presented to them on 
setting standards as to how or when they should be provided, and even on ordering the 
respective local authorities to deliver specific modifications or adjustments.  
 Fourth, the ‘4 A’s’ of education –accessibility, adaptability, availability and 
acceptability- were the indicator most frequently found in all the judicial decisions that 
were analyzed, being ‘accessibility’ the one to which the Courts referred to in all of their 
rulings. On this matter, particularly stands out the case of the ECtHR who prior to the 
ratification of the CRPD did not recognize that education must be accessible to all, which 
changed later. Also, what is interesting to note is that none of the Courts made reference 
or analysis regarding ‘universal design’ as the means to fulfill the ‘4 A’s’ and the 
elimination of standardized tests to assess intelligence, in spite the strong endorsement of 
the international community to do so.  
Fifth, as to the principles of “equity and equality”, the ratification of the CRPD had 
no significant impact on the rulings of the Courts, primarily because prior to the 
endorsement the Courts were already guaranteeing such principles as fundamental 
characteristics of the right to education. Perhaps the most important contribution on the 
matter was that due to recognition of equality before the law, the three Courts grant access 
to justice for persons wit disabilities, which led the judges to order some reparations. While 
there is no important difference to note comparing the judicial decisions before and after 
ratification, there is such in comparing the three Courts. By far and large, the CRPD has 
had much more impact on reparations order by the CCC than those ordered by the SCJN, 
not to say the ECtHR who does not usually provides redress.  
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Sixth, the ratification of the CRPD had a major impact on the ‘other principles of 
inclusive education’ indicator, at least on the ECtHR and CCC judicial decisions. Before 
ratification all judicial decisions recognized that the right to education is the means by 
which people can participate in society and achieve their fullest potential, also that the 
obligation of the state entails guaranteeing access, permanence and progress in the 
educational system. Nonetheless, these assertions were made in reference as benefits of 
education, regardless of the type or settings in which it is provided. After ratification of the 
CRPD, the ECtHR and the CCC showed, in many cases, their interest complying with the 
Convention as they specifically state that such benefits can only be achieved through an 
inclusive system in which personalized programs guarantee the right of education to all. 
Seventh, in the ‘other barriers’ indicator the clearest impact of the ratification of 
the CRPD can be seen in the adopting of a human rights approach to disability. Such is the 
case, specifically, for the ECtHR and the SCJN –as the CCC adopted the approach in earlier 
decisions-. The shift that can be observed in the CCC is that prior to the ratification, some 
judicial decisions contained words that are considered discriminatory language, which 
were totally eliminated after 2009. The recognition of attitudinal barriers is something that 
was found very sporadically, but no light on how to address them was shed by any of the 
Courts.  
The scale of this debate is therefore extensive and challenging as some Court might 
not actually want to assume active roles in the advancement of human rights. To generate 
enough information with regards to the impact of the ratification of the CRPD in judicial 
decisions on the right to inclusive education, there is need for more jurisprudence to be 
available, which probably means that a similar study should be conducted years ahead from 
 90 
now, considering that the CRPD was ratified by the State parties of the research relatively 
recently. However, this study has offered an evaluative perspective on an important aspect 
to monitor in the implementation of the CRPD, which are judicial decisions often left out 
of reports submitted by the States to the CmRPD.  
As a direct consequence of the methodology used, the analysis encountered a 
number of limitations, which need to be considered for any future references. For example, 
the ECtHR has many official languages different from English in which one might not be 
proficient and some decisions are only publish in such other languages. Thus, there might 
have been other cases to which I had no access since the search in the database was 
conducted in English. Also, the indicators used might have been somewhat comprehensive, 
but perhaps too detailed. In result, no all of those measures were found across the available 
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